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 Understanding Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws* 
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Ronen Avraham (University of Texas at Austin) 
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Daniel Schwarcz (University of Minnesota)  
 
Abstract 
Insurance companies are in the business of discrimination.  Insurers attempt to segregate insureds 
into separate risk pools based on their differences in risk profiles, first, so that they can charge 
different premiums to the different groups based on their risk and, second, to incentivize risk 
reduction by insureds.  This is why we let insurers discriminate.  There are, however, limits to 
the types of discrimination we will allow insurers to engage in.   But what exactly are those 
limits and how are they justified? To answer these questions, this Article articulates the leading 
fairness and efficiency arguments for and against limiting insurers’ ability to discriminate in their 
underwriting; identifies on this basis a set of predictions as to what one would expect state anti-
discrimination laws to look like; and evaluates some of those predictions against a unique hand-
collected dataset consisting of the laws regulating insurer risk classification in all 51 U.S. 
jurisdictions. Among our findings is that contrary to the conventional wisdom state insurance 
anti-discrimination laws vary a great deal, in substance and in the intensity of regulation, across 
lines of insurance, across policyholder characteristics, and across states. The Article also finds 
that, contrary to our predictions, a surprising number of jurisdictions do not have any laws 
restricting insurers’ ability to discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, or religion.  It 
concludes by discussing whether this fact indicates that states have inadequately policed unfair 
discrimination in insurance or impacts the larger policy decision in this country to leave 
insurance anti-discrimination law to the states.      
 
* We are grateful for comments from Kenneth Abraham, Tom Baker, Martin Grace, David Hyman, Stefanie 
Lindquist, and Charlie Silver. Nathaniel Lipanovich and Rachel Ezzell provided excellent research assistance. We 
are also thankful to the University of Michigan Law School Library staff and especially Faculty Services Reference 
Librarian Seth Quidachay-Swan and his team of law students at the University of Michigan Law School, including 
David Lund, Justin Bonfiglio, Stephanie Cunningham, and Chris Galeczka, for their heroic work in assembling the 
dataset.  
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INTRODUCTION 
We discriminate when we draw distinctions between things. Individuals, corporations, 
and governments draw distinctions all the time, and in ways that are widely considered 
unobjectionable. However, the word "discrimination" has taken on a negative connotation, 
because of the various types of discrimination "against" particular groups of people based on 
particular characteristics, such as race or religion or gender. Such discrimination is often deemed 
immoral or illegal or both.1 Much has been written by legal scholars and philosophers on the 
question of what distinguishes good discrimination from bad,2 and there are whole fields of law, 
such as employment discrimination law, that are devoted to the question of when discrimination 
should be deemed illegal and when not.3   
Insurance companies are in the business of a particular type of discrimination, not among 
their employees but among their insureds. That is how insurance works. Insurers attempt to 
classify insureds into separate risk pools based on differences in their risk profiles. Thus, insurers 
openly discriminate among individuals based on observable characteristics.  Moreover, they do 
this, among other reasons, so that they can charge different premiums to different groups of 
insureds based on differences in their risks.  Discrimination or risk classification4 by insurers can 
also create incentives for insureds to minimize risks: that is, if an insured will take care to reduce 
her risk level, a discriminating insurer will lower her premium. In a sense, these two reasons 
(accurate risk classification and incentivizing risk reduction) provide the primary justifications 
                                                          
1 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, and 
Proxies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 151 (1992) (“We all know it is wrong to refuse to hire women as truck drivers, to 
refuse to let blacks practice law, to bar Moslems from basketball teams, or to refuse to sit next to Rastafarians at 
lunch counters. At the same time, we also know it is not wrong to refuse to hire the blind as truck drivers, to refuse 
to admit those who flunk the bar exam to the practice of law, to bar short, slow, uncoordinated persons from the 
basketball team, or to refuse to sit next to people who haven't bathed recently.”); .  and DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN 
IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 1 (2008)(“And we know that while it is okay for a school principal to ask students 
with last names beginning with A-M to sit on one side of the auditorium and students with last names beginning 
with A-Z to sit on the other, it is not okay for a local law to require black bus passengers to sit in the back and whites 
in the front.”).  
2 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 1 (addressing the question generally of how to distinguish morally acceptable 
from morally unacceptable, and legal from illegal, discrimination); SANDRA FRIEDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW (2d 
ed. 2011) (same); HELLMAN, supra note 1 (same); Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong?, 
BALKINIZATION (Jun. 20, 2008, 10:30 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/when-is-discrimination-
wrong.html (same); Richard Arneson, What is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 775 (2006) (same).  
There is a large literature also on the specific question whether discrimination of particular types, such as racial 
discrimination in the workplace, is efficient or not.  See, e.g., GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 
(2d ed. 1971); John Donohue, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The 
Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII,  136 PA. L. REV. 513 (1987).  Any list of classic articles on the topic of what 
constitutes illegitimate discrimination should include Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination 
Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); and Charles R. Lawrence III, Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). 
3 See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1337, 1365-66 (1989); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 
Cal. L. Rev. 1151, 1175-76, 1180 (1995) . 
4 We use the terms “discrimination” and “risk classification” synonymously throughout this article when 
referring to insurers’ efforts to sort insureds into different groups based on differences in risks. 
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for why we let insurers discriminate. Insurers provide a valuable social function—in risk 
shifting, risk spreading and risk reduction—at least in part because they are allowed to, are 
expected to, and do discriminate. 
There are, however, limits on the discrimination that insurers are permitted to engage in.  
Some of these limits stem from federal laws.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 [“PPACA”], together with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
[“HIPAA”], forbids insurers from considering pre-existing conditions in the underwriting 
process.5 PPACA also forbids health insurers from taking gender into account.6  Likewise, the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 [“GINA”] prohibits all health insurers from 
denying coverage or charging different premiums to insureds based on genetic information.7 
Finally, a recent rule issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
provides that the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) applies to insurance and prohibits housing practices 
that have an unjustified disparate impact on protected classes.8  Besides those four recent 
statutes, however, there are no federal laws expressly forbidding insurers from engaging in any 
form of discrimination in the underwriting process.  There is therefore no federal law specifically 
forbidding insurance companies from taking into account, for example, race, religion, national 
origin, or gender, at least outside the context of homeowners insurance.   
What all of this means is that discrimination by insurers in the underwriting process is 
largely unregulated at the federal level, leaving the states as the regulators of insurer 
discrimination. How this came to be has much to do with the history of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act [“MFA”], which effectively delegated to the states the primary responsibility for regulating 
insurance in this country.9 Whether such an allocation of regulatory authority with respect to 
insurance discrimination has turned out well is an interesting and largely unstudied question, a 
question that this Article begins to answer.   
More specifically, the Article addresses three general questions. First, as the country’s 
primary promulgators of insurance anti-discrimination law, what factors should state 
                                                          
5 The other two are HIPAA and PPACA.  HIPAA prohibits groups health insurers from excluding an insured’s 
pre-existing condition from coverage for more than 12 months after the insured’s enrollment date, and the 12 month 
period was shortened or eliminated for people who were previously insured.  HIPAA also prohibited group health 
insurers from excluding individuals on the basis of genetic predisposition to certain diseases.  15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) 
(2006).  PPACA prohibits all health insurers from denying coverage on the basis of pre-existing conditions, and for 
health status generally, for children starting in 2010 for adults starting in 2014. ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154–55 
(adding § 2704 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3) (preexisting conditions); ACA § 1201, 124 
Stat. at 156–60 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (prohibiting discrimination).  
6 ACA § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156–60 (adding § 2705 to the PHSA) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4). 
7 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Act, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 122 Stat. 881, 883, 888 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b)) (adding § 1182(b) to ERISA and adding § 
300gg-1(b) to the PHSA)  
8 See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight.  
9 Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, federal laws that affect insurance are deemed “reverse preempted” by any 
conflicting state law, unless the federal law expressly provides that it is meant to apply to insurance.  15 U.S.C. § 
1012(b) (2006). 
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governments take into account when deciding whether and to what extent to limit insurers’ 
ability to discriminate?  In answering this normative question, Part I provides the first systematic 
integration of the risk-classification scholarship that has been published in insurance economics 
journals with the risk-classification scholarship of legal academics.  It distills from these 
literatures twelve different factors that may shape the normative case for laws restricting 
insurers’ capacity to discriminate among different policyholders.   
Second, taking into account the various normative considerations identified in Part I, Part 
II attempts to identify or predict what actual anti-discrimination laws state legislatures should be 
expected to enact.  These predictions will depend not only on what laws reflect the best balance 
of normative concerns but also on various political considerations, such as which laws most help 
insurers to maximize their profits (since insurers as a group will sometimes be a relatively 
powerful lobbying force) and which laws are consistent and which in conflict with widely shared 
social norms (since legislatures can also on occasion be responsive to the masses).  Part II, 
therefore, takes into account political economy concerns as well the normative considerations 
outlined in Part I.   
Third, building on Parts I and II, Part III asks the surprisingly difficult and previously 
unexamined question: what laws dealing with risk classification have states actually adopted?  
The reason this question is both difficult to answer and has been largely ignored is that the 
exercise of merely identifying the laws in all the relevant jurisdictions requires hours of 
painstaking research and analysis. And that is what we, together with a team of research 
assistants, have done. We have developed a unique, hand-collected dataset of state statutes 
governing insurer risk classification. This task required us to identify and analyze the insurance 
statutes, and any related regulatory or judicial interpretations of those statutes, in all 50 states 
(and Washington DC) and then to code those laws and sometimes their judicial or administrative 
interpretations for five different lines of insurance—health, life, disability, auto, and 
property/casualty—and for nine different characteristics—race, national origin, religion, gender, 
age, credit score, genetics, sexual orientation, and zip code. The result is the first ever 
comprehensive database of insurance anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. dealing with those nine 
characteristics.   
Part III summarizes some of the key results of our research and compares them with the 
predictions we developed in Part II.10 For example, Part II predicts that all jurisdictions would 
either forbid or strongly limit insurers’ ability to discriminate among insureds on the basis of 
race, national origin, or religion.  Indeed, based on our experience in the insurance law field over 
many years, it seems that the conventional wisdom among many if not most insurance law 
scholars, teachers, and students is that every state in the country forbids the use of such 
                                                          
10 In the interest of keeping this Article a manageable length, some of the empirical results will be explored in a 
subsequent paper. 
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characteristics, especially race, in insurance underwriting.11  Surprisingly, this prediction is 
incorrect: more than half the states do not ban the use of race in life, health, and disability 
insurance, 23 states do not ban its use in auto insurance, and 18 do not ban its use for 
property/casualty insurance. Similar statements can be made about national origin and religion.  
We also find similar gaps in state laws for other policyholder characteristics: 37 states do not ban 
the use of sexual orientation in health insurance and 40 states do not ban the use of gender in 
auto insurance.   As all this suggests, affirmative bans of insurer discrimination on the basis of 
potentially suspect policyholder traits are quite rare.  Thus, only 9 states ban the use of age in 
auto insurance; only 5 states ban the use of genetic testing in disability insurance; and only 2 
states ban the use of zip code in property/casualty insurance. 
We conclude by offering a number of tentative theories that might explain these results.  
We also consider their normative implications.  For instance, might the lack of uniformity in 
state insurance anti-discrimination regulation require a rethinking of this country’s longstanding 
practice of generally leaving insurance issues to the states?  To what extent does the fact that a 
substantial number of states have failed to even address core issues of unfair discrimination in 
their insurance laws indicate a failure in state unfair discrimination regulation writ large?   And 
what should we make of the stark contrast between this reality, and recent federal efforts to 
address facially neutral insurance classification schemes that have a disparate impact on the 
capacity of protected groups to acquire housing?12  
I. The Normative Framework 
A.  Fairness v. Efficiency 
Laws limiting risk classification in insurance implicate a tradeoff between “efficiency” 
and “fairness” concerns.13  The efficiency costs of these laws stem principally from the fact that 
they attempt to force insurers to charge the same premiums to individuals who pose different 
predicted risks.  This can generate the twin insurance harms of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.  
First, regulatory restrictions on insurers’ risk classifications can produce moral hazard by 
undermining feature rating and experience rating.14  Feature rating refers to insurer efforts to link 
                                                          
11 See, e.g.,  Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Consumer Federation of America, Lower-Income 
Households and the Auto Insurance Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMERFED.ORG, Jan. 30, 
2012, http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450 (“No states, for example, permit the use of race or income in rate-
making.”); Jill Gaulding, Race, Sex, and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: What’s Fair?, 80 CORN. L. REV. 
1646, 1646 (1994) (reporting that it would be illegal in every state for an insurer to charge more to African 
Americans because they have shorter expected life spans).  
12 See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight. 
13 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L. REV. 403 
(1985); Michael Hoy & Michael Ruse, Regulating Genetic Information in Insurance Markets, 8 RISK MGMT. & INS. 
REV. 211 (2005) (“Economists can contribute to the debate [about regulating genetic information in insurance 
markets] by casting the problem as a classic efficiency-equity trade-off.”). 
14 KENNETH ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 71-72 (1986).  
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premiums to policyholder characteristics that correlate with risk.  Experience rating, by contrast, 
refers to the linking of premiums with policyholders’ actual loss experiences.  Both mechanisms 
attempt to improve the accuracy of the premium calculation and to incentivize policyholder care 
(notwithstanding insurance coverage) by increasing the likelihood that a failure to take care will 
result in a future increase in premiums.  These tools are undermined when risk classification 
restrictions limit the capacity of insurers to adjust their premiums.15   
Second, regulatory restrictions on insurers’ risk classifications can generate adverse 
selection.  Adverse selection can occur when policyholders have private information about their 
own riskiness that insurers do not observe.  If policyholders know they cannot be charged more 
for insurance coverage even if their riskiness is higher than average, they may be more likely to 
buy insurance coverage because they will not pay its full price.16  If this occurs, then insurers 
may respond by charging low-risk individuals premiums that are too high for their risk. 
Anticipating this sort of inaccuracy in pricing, low-risk individuals may exit the risk pool and opt 
not to purchase insurance coverage at all.  To prevent this exit of low-risk policyholders, insurers 
can design policy coverage specifically to appeal to low-risks by offering incomplete coverage in 
return for a low premium.17 
By contrast, defenders of laws limiting insurers’ ability to classify risks typically rely on 
“fairness” based arguments.  Frequently these arguments embrace a vision of insurance as 
solidarity – spreading risk within communities strengthens the fabric that connects individuals by 
having them cross-subsidize each other’s risk.   Risk classification undermines this vision, they 
claim, by splitting communities into ever smaller and more fragmented risk pools, particularly 
when it trades on preexisting social inequities and stereotypes.18  Even when actuarial 
correlations between characteristics and risk can be demonstrated,  defenders of risk 
classification regulation emphasize that this correlation is socially constructed, reflecting existing 
norms, assumptions, and biases that frame both the collection and analysis of the data that 
produces risk assessments.19  By classifying risks, insurers consequently assign responsibility to 
individuals in a manner that is much less stable and objective than actuarial science suggests.20  
                                                          
15 See discussion infra Part I.B.4 
16 To be sure, insurers will classify risks even without the threat of adverse selection, because competition from 
other carriers will otherwise skim away the good risks.  This does not represent a social cost, however, unless it 
causes at least some policyholders to purchase less insurance than they would like to purchase at actuarially fair 
rates. 
17 Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
159 U. PA. L. REV.  1577, 1608-15 (2011); see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in 
Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629, 634-38 
(1976) (describing a theoretical model in which the design of the insurance market itself encourages individuals to 
self-sort into risk categories).  
18 Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199 
(2008); Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 287 (1993). 
19 François Ewald, Insurance and Risk, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 197, 206-
10 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, & Peter Miller, eds., 1991); Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification 
Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 534-36 (1983) (“However much the [insurance] companies plead 
6
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While “fairness” is generally associated with opposition to risk classification, and 
“efficiency” is associated with defenses of the practice, neither side has a monopoly on fairness- 
or efficiency-based arguments, as described more fully below.  Despite this complication, it is 
helpful to summarize the extant normative literature on risk-classification and insurance 
discrimination through the “efficiency vs. fairness” lens. Interestingly, each of these 
considerations is principally developed in a different academic literature.  The efficiency 
implications of risk classifications restrictions are explored principally in the risk management 
and economics literature, whereas the fairness arguments concerning legal restrictions on risk 
classification are explored principally in the legal literature.  The historical disconnect between 
these literatures21 means that their collective insights have not previously been integrated or even 
gathered together in a single place.22  The next two sections attempt this task. 
B.  Efficiency-Based Considerations 
1.  Adverse Selection 
As noted above, the risk of adverse selection is one potential efficiency cost of legal 
restrictions on insurers’ risk-classification practices.23  Indeed, the risk of adverse selection is so 
often associated with regulatory restrictions on risk classification that some refer to the 
phenomenon as “regulatory adverse selection.”  The social cost of adverse selection is that some 
risk-averse individuals forego coverage that they would like to purchase at actuarially fair 
rates.24  To the extent that adverse selection triggers undermines an insurance market entirely (a 
so-called “death spiral”) or leads to strategic insurer efforts to segregate low-risk and high-risk 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
happenstance, insurance ‘risk’ classifications correlate with a fairly simplistic and static notion of social 
stratification that is familiar to everyone.”). 
20 TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY (2007). 
21 See LAW AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz, ed., 2012). 
22 The paper that comes closest to collecting all of these considerations is Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Adverse 
Selection: An Economic Approach to the Law of Insurance Underwriting, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 435 (2002).  Much of 
Chandler’s paper, though, builds off of his own computer model, and it therefore misses some of the points that have 
been raised in other papers. 
23 Indeed, one of the primary writers on the topic refers to such rules as “regulatory adverse selection.”  See 
Hoy, supra 15, at 245.  The disadvantage of adverse selection can also be framed in fairness, rather than efficiency, 
terms.   Indeed, some promote the notion of actuarial fairness, which suggests that insurers have a moral 
“responsibility to treat all [their] policyholders fairly by establishing premiums at a level consistent with the risk 
represented by each policyholder.” See, e.g., Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Inculano, Aids and Insurance: The 
Rationale for Aids-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1806 (1987) (arguing that failing to screen insureds for 
AIDS would be unfair “because it results in the subsidization of high risk individuals by those at low risk”). Various 
industry-sponsored advertisements in the late 1980’s trumpeted a similar idea: that it is “unfair to pay for someone 
else’s risks.” See Stone, supra note 17. 
24 Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, 76 J. POL. ECON. 553 (1968). These efficiency costs 
are particularly large in the rare situations where adverse selection produces a “death spiral.” A death spiral occurs 
when adverse selection becomes increasingly self-reinforcing; the lowest-risk policyholders opt out of the insurance 
pool, driving up premiums and causing the next lowest-risk policyholders to opt out, and so on.   Eventually, only 
high-risk policyholders remain.  Death spirals obviously generate substantial efficiency costs, as all but very high-
risk individuals forego complete coverage.  See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An 
Exaggerated Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1224 (2004).  
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policyholders indirectly by offering multiple coverage options (a separating equilibrium), it can 
also undermine regulatory objectives to promote subsidization from low-risk to high-risk 
individuals.25  
Substantial empirical research has recently demonstrated that the threat of adverse 
selection is much more contingent on the characteristics of particular insurance markets than has 
traditionally been assumed.26 Some insurance markets are quite susceptible to adverse selection, 
while others are resistant to adverse selection.27.  Relevant factors for determining whether a 
particular insurance market is at risk of adverse selection include: (1) the absence of useful 
private information, (2) the existence of private information for some but not all policyholders in 
a market, (3) policyholders’ inability or failure to use the private information they have, (4) the 
presence of superior information or predictive power on the part of the insurer, (5) propitious 
selection resulting from interaction between risk and risk aversion or other policyholder 
characteristics associated with an increased tendency to purchase insurance, and (6) institutional 
arrangements.28 
Numerous additional factors are likely relevant to the more specific prospect that a 
regulatory risk classification restriction would trigger adverse selection.  This would certainly 
include both the size and risk levels of the population with the “high risk” characteristic whose 
use is prohibited, as both factors would mediate the ultimate impact on rates of a risk 
classification restriction.29  It would also include the elasticity of demand among the population 
of  “low-risk” policyholders, as regulatory risk classification restrictions would cause them to 
face slightly higher prices for coverage.  Elasticity of demand for insurance, in turn, would 
depend on factors such as the practical and legal necessity for the relevant type of insurance as 
well as the magnitude of potential policyholders’ risk aversion.   
Various more line-specific factors could also contribute to the risk of regulatory adverse 
selection.  For instance, risk-classification restrictions are less likely to generate adverse 
                                                          
25 Even ostensibly efficiency-oriented evaluations of risk-classification restrictions may reflect unstated 
normative commitments to individual responsibility.  This may manifest itself in these evaluations ignoring 
alternative mechanisms to manage adverse selection risks, such as the mandated purchase of insurance or the 
provision of universal coverage. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and 
Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 379-83 (2003) (cataloguing policy mechanisms for reducing adverse 
selection without resort to risk classification). 
26 Siegelman, supra note 8 at 1224 (showing that such death spirals are quite rare and that, in many cases, 
adverse selection is itself uncommon). In a recent update and extension of this article, Siegelman and Cohen find 
more mixed evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets, concluding that the phenomenon varies 
substantially across different lines of insurance and even within particular insurance lines.  Alma Cohen & Peter 
Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39 (2010).   
27 Chandler, supra note 21  (using computer modeling to show the extent to which adverse selection depends on 
numerous factors in the underlying insurance market). 
28 Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. Risk & Ins. 39 (2010).   
29 See Hoy, supra note 15 at 249-69; see also Chandler, supra note 21, at 498 (making similar point by noting 
that homogeneity of risks in the underlying pool decreases the prospect of adverse selection, whereas heterogeneity 
increases this risk).  
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selection when high-risk policyholders cannot over-insure, and thus multiply the “advantage” of 
being high-risk in a setting where carriers are forbidden from taking this into account.30 At least 
in life insurance, such over-insurance is possible because individuals can own multiple different 
policies, each of whose benefits are unaffected by the existence of other policies.31  The prospect 
of regulatory adverse selection might also be exacerbated by the existence of a secondary market 
for insurance policies, which is also a feature of life insurance and annuity markets.32  Secondary 
markets increase the risk of adverse selection by allowing high-risk individuals to purchase a 
policy with an immediate guaranteed profit.33  They also allow high-risk individuals to benefit 
personally from their life insurance products.  Finally, line-specific product features, such as the 
existence of an incontestability period after which insurers cannot deny coverage for 
misrepresentations or fraud, could also increase the risk of regulatory adverse selection.34  
2. Moral Hazard 
Legal restrictions on insurers’ ability to classify risks can result in moral hazard, causing 
policyholders to take less than socially-optimal levels of care.  For instance, some commentators 
have argued that rules prohibiting insurers from classifying policyholders on the basis of their 
health status may encourage individuals to eat less healthy foods or exercise less.35  Others have 
claimed that rules prohibiting underwriting on the basis of geographic area can result in the over-
development of homes in risk-prone regions, such as along the coast of a hurricane-prone state.36   
In order for moral hazard to potentially result from legal restrictions on risk classification, 
two conditions must be met.  First, the regulated characteristic must be at least partially within 
policyholders’ control.  A good example is a legal prohibition on insurers using health-related 
information of individuals in underwriting, as individuals clearly have some control over their 
likelihood of getting sick.  By contrast, rules prohibiting classification on the basis of age or 
                                                          
30 Hoy & Ruse, supra note 12; Chapter 6.  
31 In most insurance contexts, policies contain coordination of benefits or “other insurance” provisions, which 
prevent a policyholder from recovering under multiple policies in a way that would improve the policyholder’s 
financial condition as a result of the loss. 
32 See generally [Find cites] 
33 Risk classification rules that would prevent investors from asking about individuals’ genetic makeup, cannot 
prevent such transactions because these rules cannot prevent high-risk policyholders from volunteering information 
about their genetic predispositions to investors.  While individuals have an incentive to hide their genetic defects 
from insurers, they have the opposite incentive when selling policies to third-party investors: the sooner the 
policyholder is to die, the more investors will be willing to pay for the policy. 
34 An insurer that sells individually underwritten auto or non-auto liability and property policies can cancel 
policies or decline to renew when the policy comes up for renewal.  See ROBERT JERRY, UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW. 
35 RICHARD EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL 125-126 (1997) (“Cross-subsidies necessarily allow everyone to pass off 
some pat of the costs of their own risky behavior onto other persons.”); Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, 
Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard,  50 J.L. & Econ. 519 (2007) (finding that mandates for medical treatment 
for diabetes generate a moral hazard problem with diabetics exhibiting higher BMIs after the adoption of these 
mandates). 
36 HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET. AL., AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER: MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISKS IN A 
NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES (2009). 
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gender cannot produce moral hazard for the simple reason that individuals cannot change their 
age or gender in response to such rules.  Second, there must be some “but for” causal link 
between the regulated characteristic and risk.  Prohibitions on medical underwriting again 
provide a suitable example: an individual is more likely to incur substantial health expenses if he 
or she has a history of health-related expenses, and less likely to incur future expenses if she has 
no preexisting conditions or medical risks.  By contrast, while individuals have some degree of 
control over their credit score (thus satisfying the first condition), it is unclear whether credit 
score enjoys a “but for” causal connection to risk of loss.  Thus, while prohibitions on insurers’ 
use of credit scores in underwriting might conceivably cause people to safeguard their credit 
scores less effectively, it is not clear that this would actually lead to greater losses.    
When these two pre-requisites are met, legal restrictions on risk classification may 
generate moral hazard because they effectively operate as state-provided insurance against 
classification risk.37  In other words, by limiting the capacity of insurers to classify risks in the 
future, these rules undermine individuals’ incentives to take care by protecting them from the 
risk that their present behavior will impair their capacity to purchase affordable insurance in the 
future.  Thus, prohibiting health insurers from charging more to smokers may increase the 
incidence of smoking and health risk because individuals will not worry that their decision to 
smoke will subject them to increased insurance premiums in the future.  The magnitude of this 
effect likely depends substantially on the extent to which individuals appreciate the potential 
links between their behavior and future premiums.38  Thus, individuals are unlikely to change 
their smoking habits in response to legal restrictions on insurers’ underwriting if they are 
unaware of the potential link, or lack thereof, between smoking and future premiums. 39 
3. Socially Wasteful Expenditures 
The efficiency of risk-classification regulations may also be impacted by the prospect that 
insurers’ classification efforts are socially wasteful.  One of the primary ways that insurers 
compete in unregulated insurance markets is by attempting to classify risks more accurately in 
order to skim good risks from other companies and dump bad risks on those companies.  These 
efforts may be socially beneficial to the extent that they increase the number of low-risk 
individuals who choose to purchase full insurance.40  At the same time, though, these efforts 
produce no social benefit to the extent that they merely shift the composition of policyholders 
among different carriers, at least in those cases where moral hazard is not a possible outgrowth 
of risk classification.  From a social welfare standpoint, the same individuals are insured and 
only the distribution of the resulting social benefits is at stake in the particular matching of 
                                                          
37 See supra note 23  and accompanying text. 
38 Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
39 On the difficulties of empirically estimating moral hazard and adverse selection see Ronen Avraham, The 
Economics of Insurance Law—A Primer, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1822330. 
40 Whether they are in fact socially beneficial requires weighing the social benefit of increased coverage for 
low-risk individuals against the cost of less insurance coverage for high-risk individuals. 
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insurers and policyholders.  By contrast, these efforts do indeed produce a social cost in the form 
of money spent on classifying policyholders, which may be passed on to policyholders through 
increased premiums.41  
In these settings, risk-classification regulations can be justified as a means for preventing 
socially wasteful investments.42  The power of this rationale for regulation depends largely on 
the extent to which risk classification is costly.  Thus, it is likely to be a more powerful 
consideration when classification requires medical tests, genetic tests, physical examinations of 
individuals or property, or extensive analysis of loss data and mitigation measures.43  Indeed, this 
argument figured prominently in debates about health care reform’s prohibition on medical 
underwriting precisely because of the cost of such underwriting.44  Interestingly, this argument 
may also be persuasive when a carrier is legally or contractually required to investigate 
representations in insurance applications, as is the case with doctrines imposing a duty to 
underwrite or establishing a period of incontestability. 
4. Private Acquisition of Information 
Another relevant consideration in evaluating the efficiency of laws restricting risk 
classification by insurers is the extent to which insurers’ classification efforts impact individuals’ 
ex ante incentives to learn of their own risk characteristics.  Individuals may be deterred from 
learning about their own risk profiles when insurers can use that information in underwriting.  
This is a particular problem when the relevant information is expensive for carriers to uncover on 
                                                          
41 Keith J. Crocker & Arthur Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance 
Industry, 94 J. POL. ECON. 321, 338 (1986) (“[F]or intermediate levels of cost the market still categorizes even 
though the winners from categorization could not compensate the losers.”).  In this way, these private risk 
classification efforts are analogous to individual investments in protecting property that merely shift crime to 
neighbors rather than reducing aggregate crime levels; in both cases parties invest in protecting themselves only to 
shift costs on to others 
42 Of course, risk-classification regulation may not be the optimal way to respond to this problem.  For instance, 
one recent article argues that it is preferable for governments to adopt partial social insurance that induces firms to 
invest in classification only to the extent that doing so is socially efficient.  Casey Rothschild, The Efficiency of 
Categorical Discrimination in Insurance Markets, 78 CONN. INS. L.J. 267 (2011).  Of course, social insurance 
schemes raise their own set of efficiency problems and are often, as a practical matter, not politically feasible. 
43 See Crocker & Snow, supra note 41.  Genetic rating has attracted a wildly disproportionate amount of 
scholarly attention, even while far more commonplace forms of risk classification have slipped by without much 
academic comment.   See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discrimination in a Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 363 (2003); Nancy Kass & Amy Medley, Genetic Screening and Disability Insurance: What Can We Learn 
from the Health Insurance Experience?, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 66 (2007); Robert Lowe, Genetic Testing and 
Insurance: Apocalypse Now?, 40 DRAKE L. REV. 507 (1991) Robert F. Rich & Julian Ziegler, Genetic 
Discrimination in Health Insurance – Comprehensive Legal Solutions for a (Not So) Special Problem?, 2 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 5 (2005); Mark A. Rothstein, Predictive Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease in Long-Term 
Care Insurance, 35 GA. L. REV. 707 (2001); Richard H. Underwood & Ronald C. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic Testing, 
and the Specter of Discrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases, 85 KY. L. J. 665. 
44 Paul Krugman, Health Care Realities, NYTIMES.COM, Jul. 30, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/opinion/31krugman.html  (“And in their efforts to avoid “medical losses,” the 
industry term for paying medical bills, insurers spend much of the money taken in through premiums not on medical 
treatment, but on ‘underwriting’ — screening out people likely to make insurance claims.”).   
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a case-by-case basis.  Such insurers will only be able to classify individuals through underwriting 
applications that ask applicants to represent their subjective knowledge of their risk levels, 
backed by the threat of rescission in the event a misrepresentation is subsequently discovered.  In 
order to avoid this risk, individuals may simply refrain from learning about their risk status.  This 
argument has gained particular salience in the context of genetic risk classification, with many 
commentators arguing that individuals are deterred from acquiring valuable information about 
their genetic makeup because of the potential insurance consequences of doing so.45 The social 
costs associated with individuals not learning their own risk characteristics include denial of 
access to preventive medical care and decreased financial and family planning for a shorter 
expected life span.46  
 
5.  Positive Externalities of Risky Behavior 
In some cases, individuals become high risk as a result of behavior that is socially 
productive in the aggregate.  For instance, doctors in high-risk specialties such as obstetrics 
provide necessary and socially valuable services, even though their decision to become a 
specialist exposes them to substantial risk that may not be fully compensated for through higher 
salaries.  Similarly, individuals who decide to have children obviously generate substantial social 
benefits that may not be fully captured by the personal benefits of raising children.  But they also 
expose themselves to large new risks.  In both cases, one can argue that insurers should be 
prohibited from charging individuals more for their socially beneficial choices because this will 
drive the underlying activity below socially optimal levels.47 On the other hand, it is not clear 
that the most efficient way to subsidize high risk socially productive behavior is via the 
insurance markets, and not, say, via the tax and transfer systems.48  
6.  Efficient Redistribution 
Efficiency-oriented legal scholarship typically assumes that income redistribution should 
generally be ignored in analyzing optimal legal rules, because such redistribution is most 
efficiently accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system.49 However, laws restricting 
insurers’ use of certain characteristics may provide a type of redistribution from the better off to 
the less well off that is preferable to redistribution within a tax-and-transfer system.50 This is 
because such laws produce a transfer that naturally approximates the difference in well being 
associated with the characteristic.  That is, assuming the characteristic in fact correlates with 
                                                          
45 See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, 
Law & Policy, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6, 15 (2007). 
46 Ronen Avraham, supra note 39, at 22.  
47 Daniel Wikler, Personal and Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 47, 53 (2002); Mark 
Geistfeld, AALS Annual Meeting Presentation. 
48 Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 
TAX. L. REV. 157 (2003).   
49 LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002). 
50 See Logue & Avraham, supra note 48. 
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differences in expected losses, forbidding the use of that characteristic results in a transfer to 
each insured who has the trait in an amount equal to the average expected losses associated with 
the trait.  And this transfer is funded by slightly higher premiums charged to the insureds in the 
pool who do not have the trait.  Moreover, assuming the risk-classification restrictions target 
only traits that are beyond the insured’s control (such as race or gender or genes), they have an 
advantage over a redistributive income tax regime, which has the notorious effect of distorting 
individuals’ work/leisure decisions.51 
7. Collective Action Problems 
Rules limiting insurers’ ability to classify risks may theoretically encourage insurers to 
develop more efficient risk-classification schemes if these schemes have public good attributes.52 
Risk-classification methods are at least partially non-rivalrous because multiple insurers can use 
them simultaneously.53  Similarly, certain risk-classification frameworks may be non-excludable 
because carriers can mimic innovations developed by a competitor.54 These characteristics 
suggest that individual insurers may have insufficient incentives to develop new risk 
classification technologies.  Regulation that prohibited antiquated risk-classification schemes 
might be able to overcome this problem by encouraging insurers to develop alternative, and more 
accurate, approaches to risk classification.55  Of course, a major weakness of this argument is 
that it assumes that insurers would respond to risk classification restrictions by developing more 
accurate classification schemes.  Yet insurers may well opt for even less accurate proxies for risk 
in the face of restrictions on their classification practices.  Thus, auto insurers prohibited from 
rating on the basis of age may instead rate based only on zip code, which can be a proxy for age.  
8.  Insurer Usage of Underlying Characteristic 
                                                          
51 The disadvantage of risk-classification restrictions as a form of redistribution is that, if the insurance pools are 
relatively small, it might be considered unfair that the additional costs associated with the particular trait are being 
subsidized by only a small portion of the population; whereas, a tax-and-transfer approach would spread these costs 
over the entire tax base.  Logue & Avraham, supra note 48. 
52 See Abraham, supra note 13, at 423. 
53 To be sure, the more rivals that use an improved risk-classification scheme, the less that each insurer can 
thereby gain a competitive advantage by skimming good risks from competitors.   
54 Even though insurers generally do not need to reveal the details of their risk-classification schemes under 
most state laws, and states provide trade secret protection to disclosed classification schemes, certain pricing 
strategies may be relatively easy for competitors to observe simply through market research.  
55 One potential example of this is the use of age in auto insurance.   Age is a cheap, albeit imprecise, predictor 
of expected loss.  Age may be predictive of expected loss because it proxies for characteristics such as (i) driving 
experience, (ii) likelihood of drunk driving, and (iii) attentiveness.  By prohibiting insurers from relying on age, 
lawmakers may prod insurers to develop better ways of directly measuring these more casual contributors to risk.  
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Laws forbidding the use of a characteristic in underwriting may be hard to justify if 
insurers are not actually discriminating among policyholders on the basis of that characteristic.56  
To some extent, though, this depends on why insurers are not using the relevant characteristic. 
First, if insurers do not use a rating characteristic because it has no apparent predictive 
value, then the case for legally restricting the use of this characteristic is extremely weak.  
Insurers are unlikely to ever use a characteristic with no predictive power in underwriting, 
meaning that the only social benefit such a law might provide is to articulate a moral 
commitment to a principle.  But such a law could produce potentially meaningful social costs in 
the form of the public cost of legislating and the private cost of policing compliance.57  
Second, the case for regulation may be slightly stronger when the reason that carriers do 
not use a policyholder characteristic is because the cost of determining and verifying the 
characteristic outweighs the benefits of a more refined classification scheme.58 Here, a plausible 
case can be made for laws restricting insurers’ usage of characteristics that are predictive of risk, 
but nonetheless not used because of the cost to insurers of evaluating that characteristic:  even 
though insurers are not currently employing the troubling characteristic in their underwriting, 
this may change as the composition of the population or cost of collecting accurate policyholder 
information changes. Legal prohibitions on risk classification can therefore be justified as a 
mechanism for preventing potentially problematic insurer behavior in the future.  
Finally, the case for regulation is relatively strong if insurers are refraining from using 
problematic policyholder characteristics because they fear the potential reputational or regulatory 
consequences of doing so.59  There is good evidence that this occurs.  For instance, both auto and 
life insurers often do not take into account policyholder occupation or geographic location, even 
though both have been shown to predict claims and are relatively easy for insurers to 
determine.60  Similarly, long term care insurers do not generally take into account gender, even 
though this has a substantial impact on claims experiences.61 Evidence that smaller and newer 
                                                          
56 Evidence suggests that states often do pass coverage mandates that have no practical effect because all known 
insurance plans are consistent with those mandates.  See Amy Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health 
Insurance Content Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139 (2012). 
57 Compliance costs may exist even if insurers are not using the underlying risk characteristic, because the 
carrier must expend funds confirming that this is not the case. 
58 See generally Amy Finkelstein & James Porterba, Testing for Adverse Selection with “Unused Observables” 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12112, 2006) (noting that insurers often do not use 
policyholder characteristics in underwriting even though these characteristics have predictive value, and offering 
various potential explanations for this phenomenon).  
59 See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 58. Finkelstein and Porterba note a fourth potential explanation: that 
the predictive content of characteristics such as place of residence may be limited by the extent to which such 
characteristics are subject to change in response to characteristic-based pricing differentials.  As they note, however, 
this is unlikely to be a substantial factor in most cases because the difficulty of changing the underlying 
characteristic will generally be larger than the potential insurance benefits of doing so. 
60 See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 58, at 21. 
61 See Jeffrey Browne & Amy Finkelstein, The Private Market for Long-Term Care Insurance In The United 
States: A Review of the Evidence, 76 J. RISK & INS. 5 (2009).  
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firms have been more willing than established firms to introduce rating innovations suggests that 
this behavior is partially explained by the fear of public or regulatory backlash; newer and 
smaller firms are likely to be less deterred by the prospect of reputational or market backlash as a 
result of risk classification innovation.62  In these cases, laws explicitly limiting insurers’ ability 
to employ the suspect characteristics have the benefit of reducing regulatory uncertainty.  Of 
course, a coherent argument can be made that regulation in these settings in neither necessary or 
wise: when norms and reputation are sufficient to constrain private behavior, it may be best for 
law to avoid intervention because of the risk that it may “crowd out” those norms.63   
C.  Fairness-Related Considerations64 
1. Control and Social Solidarity 
Perhaps the most frequently invoked argument in favor of risk-classification regulation is 
that it is unfair to allow insurers to charge different rates based on characteristics that are beyond 
individuals’ control.65  This argument is typically grounded in a particular vision of insurance 
that emphasizes its capacity to promote social solidarity, or just egalitarian redistribution, by 
broadly distributing risks.  From this perspective, many risks are the inevitable byproduct of the 
environment we all operate within, such as the political regime (modern capitalism vs socialism), 
technological and scientific advancements, and other features of the social landscape that are, 
from the individual’s perspective, pure luck. The economic costs associated with these risks 
should be distributed in a morally-blind manner.66 Insurance is a social and economic tool for 
counteracting this ethically unbound distribution of losses, allowing the collective to largely rid 
itself of undeserved risk.  When insurers classify policyholders based on individual 
                                                          
62 See Finkelstein & Porterba, supra note 58. 
63 See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2000); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 568-71 (2001).  
64 This Section draws heavily from Ken Abraham’s path-breaking article, Efficiency and Fairness in Risk 
Classification.  See Abraham, supra note 13. 
65 See, e.g., Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic 
Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 AM J.L. & MED. 109, 112-13 (1991) (“Discrimination based on actual or 
perceived genetic characteristics denies an individual equal opportunity because of a status over which she has no 
control.”).  Although typically framed in fairness language, this argument can be understood in economic terms to 
preserve the ability of individuals to purchase insurance against these risks, which is welfare enhancing.  From this 
perspective, being born with unfavorable genes or permanent health problems is just like any other exogenous risk 
against which people desire insurance.  Prohibiting insurers from classifying on this basis merely allows people to 
protect themselves against this risk even though they cannot purchase pre-birth insurance that specifically covers the 
risk of being born with an unfavorable genetic hand. See, e.g., Michael Hoy, Risk Classification and Social Welfare, 
31 GENEVA PAPERS 245, 262-63 (2006) For a discussion of the possibility in the future of genetic endowment 
insurance, which would cover just this sort of risk, and the problems that such insurance might present, see Kyle 
Logue & Joel Slemrod, Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information, 61 NAT. 
TAX J. 843, 858-60 (2008) (discussing possibility of “genetic endowment insurance”). 
66 EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 33-51, (Tom Baker & 
Jonathan Simon, eds., 2002); JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 42 (2006); Ewald, supra note 19, at 197-
210; Mariner, supra note 18; Stone, supra note 18. 
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characteristics, they undermine this feature of insurance by “fragmenting communities into ever-
smaller, more homogenous groups.”67 
Although the strongest version of the social solidarity norm would prohibit all forms of 
risk classification, many proponents of the social solidarity view will still permit classification 
when policyholders have control over the relevant characteristic. In such cases, it is fair to 
charge higher premiums because people choose to lead their life in a risky way. However, 
defining what “control” means in this context is not always easy – or objective.  Individuals are 
generally deemed to have control over a relevant characteristic when they knowingly and 
voluntarily make choices that determine their status as high-risk or low risk.  For instance, 
automobile insurers are generally (though not always)68 allowed to charge more to individuals 
who have been in an accident or received a speeding ticket: policyholders have a large degree of 
control over these factors because they can choose to drive more slowly or safely.  Similarly, but 
on the other end of the spectrum, one reason commentators are often so opposed to genetic-
underwriting is because people do not choose their genetic composition.   
In many cases, though, it is hard to assess whether policyholders control their risk status.  
For instance, while individuals clearly exert some level of control over their health status, this 
control is obviously highly limited: fit people often get sick, and many obese individuals live 
until old age.  Of course, it is theoretically possible to hold people responsible only for health 
features that involve choice, such as smoking, eating, and working out.  But even in these 
domains, it is difficult to determine what choice means.  Much behavior that seems voluntary 
may actually be the result of habit adopted in young age or addiction and, in any event, is highly 
correlated with numerous social factors, such as growing up in poverty or in a particular cultural 
setting.69   
2. Socially Suspect Classifications 
A second fairness-based explanation for regulatory classification restrictions is that 
insurers should be prohibited from making classifications that are socially suspect.  The concept 
of socially suspect classifications is difficult to define with perfect clarity.  The term itself is a 
product of U.S. constitutional law. According to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the equal 
protection clause of the 14th Amendment, laws that discriminate on the basis of certain 
characteristics are subject to a heightened degree of judicial review. Thus, while the vast 
majority of laws that discriminate among different groups will be upheld as valid so long as 
those laws have merely a “rational basis,” laws that discriminate on the basis of suspect 
classifications will be struck down unless they meet a higher standard of judicial review. 
                                                          
67 Stone, supra note 18, at 290. 
68 See Massachusetts law that requires insurers to give drivers one free accident. [Find cites] 
69 See, e.g., Daniel Wikler, Personal and Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 47, 53 
(2002). 
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According to the Court, suspect classifications can be identified by virtue of having three 
factors in common: (1) there is a history of discrimination against the group in question; (2) the 
characteristics that distinguish the group bear no relationship to the group members’ ability to 
contribute to society; (3) the distinguishing characteristics are immutable; and (4) the subject 
class lacks political power.70 Applying these criteria, the Court has identified three 
characteristics—race, religion, and national origin—that are considered suspect characteristics 
and thus receive the highest level of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny.71 In addition, the Court 
has also identified a class of “quasi-suspect” characteristics (to date limited to gender and 
illegitimacy of birth) that receive an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny.72 Given the criteria 
cited above, these judicial categories appear to be meant to provide protection for groups who 
not only have been habitually and unjustifiably discriminated against, but who also lack the 
political power to do anything about it.73 
The Constitution and the courts are not the only sources of meaning for what constitutes a 
socially suspect classification.  More generally, we might regard as socially suspect any 
classification that that reinforces or perpetuates broader social inequalities, or that causes some 
sort of expressive harm by acknowledging and legitimating prior unfair treatment. 74  For 
instance, society might object to an insurer who announced that it was willing to sell annuities at 
better rates to African-Americans because they tend to have a shorter life span.  This objection 
might persist even though the traditionally disadvantaged group is made better off as a result of 
the insurer classification scheme.75   
3. “Differential Inaccuracy”76 
A third fairness-based objection to risk classification arises out of the fact that all 
classification regimes are imperfect.  Not only are predictions about the future inherently 
                                                          
70 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442, 445, 454. 
71 The Caroline Products case famously established strict scrutiny and the concept of suspect classifications. 
United States v. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  Subsequent cases identified race (Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)), national origin, (Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644–46 (1948)) and  religion 
(Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993)),  as suspect classifications. 
72 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the legal classification in question be “substantially related to an important 
governmental objective.” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).  For cases establishing the categories of quasi-
suspect classifications, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (sex); and Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 
98–99 (1982) (illegitimacy). 
73 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
74 Abraham frames this category more broadly in his article, stating that a classification can be suspect for at 
least four reasons: (i) it is used improperly in other fields, (ii) it is not supported by sufficient data, (iii) it 
systematically works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or (iv) it perpetuates unfair disadvantages outside of 
the insurance system.  In general, though, none of the first three explanations seem problematic unless they are 
coupled with the fourth.  It is not, for instance, troubling that classification schemes systematically work to the 
disadvantage of individuals with bad driving records.  Similarly, Abraham himself argues elsewhere in his article 
that mere inaccuracy is not, in itself, a basis for a fairness objection.  See Abraham, supra note 13. 
75 Although often framed in terms of fairness, this argument can also be understood in economic terms as an 
externality argument: insurers impose harms on society at large by relying on certain suspect classifications. 
76 ABRAHAM, supra note 14 (coining this phrase). 
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uncertain, but classification is itself costly.  Efficient insurance regimes will only invest in 
improving classification to the extent that the resulting benefits are larger than this cost.  These 
imperfections arguably do not inherently raise fairness concerns, as all policyholders are better 
off when insurers choose not to invest beyond efficient levels in refining classification regimes.77  
However, inaccuracy in classification can raise fairness concerns when the burden of inaccuracy 
is differentially allocated among policyholders, so that some groups bear a larger share of the 
cost of such inaccuracy than other groups.78   For instance, differential inaccuracy was a central 
concern in the substantial literature on the use of HIV/AIDs status in insurance underwriting.  
During the AIDS panic in the late 1980s, various life and health insurers began to include AIDS-
based coverage exclusions in their policies.79 Various commentators excoriated this practice, 
arguing that the HIV antibody test was too unreliable to support such testing because it created 
an unacceptably heterogeneous population of AIDS sufferers and false positives, forcing the 
latter to bear the financial burden of the former.80  
4.  Correlation and Causation 
Insurance classification schemes are based on correlations between observed 
policyholder characteristics and ultimate losses.81  Of course, a correlation between two data 
points does not necessarily imply a causal relationship.  According to the American Academy of 
Actuaries, insurer classification may “be more acceptable to the public if there is a demonstrable 
cause and effect relationship between the risk characteristics and expected costs.”82  Often, 
though, objections to risk classification schemes that are articulated in terms of a lack of a causal 
connection seem to in fact be driven by the perceived lack of a strong enough correlational 
connection.  For instance, detractors of gender-based insurance rating in life insurance often 
contrast gender with age, arguing that “the association between age and mortality is much 
stronger than that between sex and mortality.” 83 Similarly, at least some of the resistance to 
race-based life insurance rating “undoubtedly comes from the perception that it makes little 
factual sense, because… [t]he apparent differences are mostly environmental.”84   
                                                          
77 See ABRAHAM, supra note 14; Abraham, supra note 13, at 429-31. 
78 See ABRAHAM, supra note 14; Abraham, supra note 13, at 431-34. 
79 Karen A. Clifford & Russel P. Inculano, Aids and Insurance: The Rationale for Aids-Related Testing, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1806 (1987). Even after the AIDS panic had subsided, some suspected that insurers were continuing 
to discriminate against homosexuals as an at-risk group, by secretly targeting men in stereotypically gay 
occupations.  Katy Chi-Wen Li, The Private Insurance Industry’s Tactics Against Suspected Homosexuals: 
Redlining Based on Occupation, Residence, and Marital Status, 22 AM.J.L. & MED. 477 (1996). 
80 Judith A. Berman, Note, AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting: A Paradigmatic 
Inquiry, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1059 (1989). 
81 Professor Robert Rhee, Remarks at the Insurance Law Section of the AALS Annual Meeting (Jan. 7, 2012). 
82 See American Academy of Actuaries.  
83 Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Efficient Use of Group Averages as 
Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 250 (1983); see also Spencer L. Kimball, 
Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 4 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 83, 108 (1979) (“Age discrimination 
is so basic in life insurance and annuities that any serious challenge to it seems unlikely.”). 
84 Kimball, supra note 64. 
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What these quotations reveal is just how slippery the meaning of “causation” can be in 
this context.85  Indeed, it is often not clear exactly what is meant by assertions that a relationship 
between an underwriting factor and risk is causal.86  Perhaps the clearest answer is that there is a 
“but for” causal link, such that a change in the characteristic being underwritten would 
necessarily produce a change in loss experiences, holding all else equal.  Thus, the causal link 
between credit scores and losses could be contested on the basis that credit scores decreased 
significantly in the wake of the Great Recession, but loss experiences did not adjust 
accordingly.87  (Of course, if it is relative credit score—the score compared to others—that 
matters to insurers, then a general drop in the average credit score is not relevant to insurers’ risk 
analyses.)   
But while “but for” causation may be necessary, it is likely not sufficient for a casual 
relationship to exist, as any first-year tort student can explain.  Just as in tort law, causation 
inevitably also includes some notion of “proximate cause” to ensure that the relationship 
between a but-for characteristic and loss is not excessively attenuated. None of this means that 
the concept of causation cannot be operationalized in insurance: for instance, most would agree 
that the link between smoking and life expectancy is causal.  Rather, it means that this link 
depends on factors such as the degree of correlation between policyholder characteristic and risk 
of loss as well as the ease with which one can construct stories connecting policyholder 
characteristics and risk.  
To the extent that causal links between policyholder characteristics and risk can be 
meaningfully identified, they tend to play one of two roles in fairness-based critiques of risk-
classification schemes and their regulation.  First, whenever the link between a particular 
characteristic and risk is perceived to be non-casual, the use of the characteristic may be 
challenged on the grounds of differential inaccuracy, as described above.  In such cases, it can 
always be argued that (i) the relevant characteristic is simply a proxy for some other causal 
contributor to risk, and (ii) the burden of this inaccuracy is only borne by the portion of the risk 
pool with the relevant characteristic. For instance, suppose that recent immigrants tend to get into 
more car accidents, but that is entirely attributable to the fact that many recent immigrants were 
trained to drive on the left side of the road.  In these circumstances, charging recent immigrants 
more might be contested due to the lack of causation between the characteristic and risk.  In fact, 
though, the fairness concern is better framed in terms of differential inaccuracy: the insurer 
practice has the effect of forcing all recent immigrants, including those who learned to drive on 
the right side of the road, to bear the burden associated with imperfect rating. 
                                                          
85 Regina Austin, supra note 19, at 559-63 (“Causation cannot serve as a neutral basis . . . .  Causal attribution is 
merely a subterfuge and cannot be a substitute for value judgment.”). 
86 Indeed, according to the American Academy of Actuaries, “in insurance it is often impossible to prove 
statistically any postulated cause and effect relationship.” American Academy of Actuaries (AAA), Committee on 
Risk Classification.  
87 See supra Part I.B.2 
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A second, logically distinct, objection to the use of characteristics that are not perceived 
to be causally connected to risk is that using such characteristics can have the effect of masking 
classification practices that are objectionable for reasons already noted, such as lack of 
policyholder control or because they trade on socially suspect characteristics. For instance, the 
primary objection to insurers’ use of credit scores to rate individuals is that this simply proxies 
for other, more objectionable, policyholder characteristics, such as race and income.88  This 
argument is logically distinct from the differential inaccuracy point because it is based on the 
notion that the lack of understanding of the connection between the characteristic and the risk 
masks some unfair result. 
5.  Privacy 
 A final fairness-based factor in evaluating the propriety of insurer risk-classification 
measures is policyholder privacy.  Although the purchase of insurance is usually voluntary, 
insurance is often a practical pre-requisite to a wide range of modern necessities, such as driving 
and owning a home.  Consequently, allowing insurers to demand certain highly personal pieces 
of information – such as HIV status, genetic information, or sexual orientation – is often viewed 
as unduly intrusive.89  More recently, there are also concerns that insurers violate policyholder 
privacy when they acquire information for underwriting without meaningful cooperation or 
consent from policyholders.  This might include information about consumers’ browsing 
histories and purchasing patterns that individuals do not reasonably expect will be available to 
insurers in underwriting.  
II. Predicting State Insurance Law and Regulation 
This Part attempts to translate the broad range of normative factors discussed in Part I 
into specific predictions about the contours of state insurance anti-discrimination law.  Because 
state insurance law and regulation is ultimately a political exercise, it attempts to balance the 
conflicting normative concerns discussed in Part I with the political realities of state insurance 
regulation.  The principal goal of this Part is simply to provide a framework for analyzing the 
data regarding the actual pattern of state laws governing insurer risk classification, which are 
reviewed in Part III.  Given the tentative nature of our hypotheses, and how easy it would be for 
the balance of concerns to be given slightly different weight in different contexts, we will not be 
shocked to find that the results diverge from our predictions. 
A.  Setting the Stage: Key Assumptions and the Political Economy of Insurance 
                                                          
88 Federal Trade Commission, Credit-Based Insurance Scores: Impacts on Consumers of Automobile 
Insurance (July 2007), available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/07/P044804FACTA_Report_Credit-
Based_lnsurance_Scores.pdf>. 
89 See, e.g., Sandra E. Stone, HIV Testing and Insurance Applicants: Exploring Constitutional Alternatives to 
Statutory Protections, 19 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1163, 1181-83 (1992).  
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Drawing from two distinct literatures on insurance discrimination, Part I identified the 
efficiency and fairness considerations that a benevolent legislature might consider in deciding 
whether to restrict an insurer’s ability to discriminate with respect to a particular characteristic in 
the underwriting process. But how might these various normative considerations affect which 
particular state laws get enacted?  Making such predictions is fraught with difficulty, for two 
general reasons.  First, fairness and efficiency concerns often, though not always, cut in opposite 
directions. Trading off efficiency and fairness concerns is what lawmakers are asked to do every 
day, but predicting the outcome of such balancing is no easy task. 
The second difficulty arises from the fact that lawmaking is messy. There are of course 
many different theories of how law gets made.  Interest group theories tend to view legal rules—
statutes and regulations and even court decisions—as outputs of a market-like process in which 
interested parties use the lawmaking process to “purchase” legal outcomes that further their 
interests.90  From this perspective, the arguments from Part I that are most likely to impact 
legislative outcomes are those that impact insurers’ bottom lines. By contrast, public interest 
theories tend to be more optimistic about what motivates legislatures, agencies, and judges and 
thus more optimistic about the nature and quality of the laws they produce.91 On this more rosy 
view, all of the fairness and efficiency arguments developed in part I should carry actual weight 
with lawmakers, whether the mechanism for this result is the altruism of the legislators 
themselves or the existence of effective politicians who are able to convert good policy 
arguments into effective political leverage. The best theories of the lawmaking process, of 
course, adopt a blend of these competing approaches. Such blended theories take seriously the 
political influence of relatively small but well-organized and highly motivated interest groups, 
while simultaneously acknowledging the power of the diffuse majority with respect to issues that 
they care about—or are made to care about.  We take a blended approach in this Article.   
There is support for taking such an approach in the political science literature.  The 
definitive study of the political economy of the insurance industry is The Political Economy of 
Regulation: The Case of Insurance, by Kenneth J. Meier.92  Meier concluded that no single 
theory could fully describe the landscape of insurance regulation.  Rather, insurance regulation is 
a multi-faceted and complex activity that is influenced by a number of competing and often 
conflicting interests.  To be sure, insurance companies often do get their way in the regulatory 
domain, even on occasion at the expense policyholders’ best interests—or at least what some 
consumer interest group regards as their best interests.93   At the same time, though, insurers are 
                                                          
90 See, e.g,, Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An 
Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 227-33 (1986) 
91 See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE RISE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE (1975).  
92 KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE (1988). 
93 Robert Hunter, A Failure of Oversight in Need of Rescue: Insurance Regulation, 13 NY Bar Association 
Journal of Government, Law and Policy 2 (2011); Daniel Schwarcz, Preventing Capture Through Consumer 
Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING CAPTURE (David Moss & 
Daniel Carpenter, eds.) (Cambridge, 2012). 
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not always able to completely capture state regulation.  In part, this is because the insurance 
industry is heterogeneous with respect to many issues, as property/casualty insurers sometimes 
have different interests than life insurers and large companies sometimes have different interests 
than small insurers.94  But it is also because consumer groups and political entrepreneurs can 
organize consumer opposition to certain industry-friendly positions, and, in many cases, highly 
motivated regulators or “bureaucrats” effectively advocate for their own vision of the public 
interest.95  Additionally, scrutiny of insurance issues at the federal level can often trigger state 
regulatory reform.96  
B. Predictions 
1. Efficiency based predictions 
Adverse selection:  As discussed in Part I, one major efficiency cost of disallowing 
insurers’ ability to classify according to certain characteristics is that it inhibits insurers’ ability 
to combat the problem of adverse selection. Adverse selection is not merely a problem of social 
efficiency; it threatens insurers’ ability to make a profit by insuring particular risks.  
Additionally, adverse selection can actually undermine fairness-based rationales for limiting 
discrimination, at least if it is sufficiently severe to produce a death spiral or if insurers can 
combat it by segregating risks indirectly by offering different levels of coverage.  Thus, we 
predict that, for those line/characteristic combinations where adverse selection is especially 
problematic, state anti-discrimination laws will tend to be relatively weak on average because (i) 
some insurers will be strongly motivated to ensure this result, (ii) other industry players will have 
little reason to oppose this result, and (iii) this result is potentially consistent with fairness-based 
arguments.    
Adverse selection is a bigger problem for some line/characteristic combinations than for 
others, and so we expect to see relatively weak risk-classification regulation in those lines of 
insurance in which adverse selection is an especially severe problem.  For example, as discussed 
in Part I, there are reasons to believe that adverse selection may be an especially difficult 
problem for life insurers.  First, life insurance is one area where there is a possibility of over-
insurance that does not exist in the same way with other types of insurance, because, unlike other 
types of insurance, life insurance policies do not contain coordination-of-coverage or other 
insurance provisions.97  Second, there is a strong secondary market in life insurance, but not in 
other types of insurance, which increases the value to insureds of successfully adversely 
selecting into life insurance pools in particular.98  Third, life, and to a lesser extent health, 
insurers face substantial product design and legal restrictions in their ability to cancel or non-
                                                          
94 Meier, supra note 98, at at 167. 
95 Id. 
96 Id; See also Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Fixing the Lack of Transparency in Insurance 
Consumer Protection, U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2013).  
97 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36. 
98 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. 
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renew policies, because they must generally do so within the statutory incontestability period.99 
Fourth, life insurance policyholders are often keenly aware of both their risk characteristics (such 
as age and gender) and how they effect mortality risk.100  Finally, life insurance is generally not 
legally or practically required for policyholders.101  Moreover, there are various substitute 
financial products for many forms of life insurance and particularly annuity products.  These 
factors will tend to increase the elasticity of demand and therefore the risk for adverse 
selection.102 
Moral hazard:  Moral hazard also threatens insurers’ profitability, and thus we would 
make a similar prediction here:  for those line/characteristic combinations where moral hazard is 
especially problematic, state anti-discrimination laws will tend to be relatively weak.  Because 
moral hazard is only an issue with respect to factors over which an insured has some control,103 
this moral-hazard prediction is consistent with a fairness-based prediction: for characteristics 
considered to be totally within an insured’s control, state anti-discrimination laws will tend to be 
weaker on average than for characteristics that are considered totally outside of the insured’s 
control.  Likewise, since whether a characteristic is within a person’s control can be considered a 
matter of degree, we would predict that the less within one’s control a characteristic is the 
stronger will be the applicable anti-discrimination law.  
Insurer use of underlying characteristic: For characteristics that do not provide any 
predictive value to insurers, like zip code in disability  insurance, we predict that the average 
level of regulation will be very weak, unless there is some strong expressive or symbolic reason 
for regulation.104  For characteristics that may have predictive value to insurers, but which 
insurers nonetheless have not historically used, we predict that the average level of regulation 
will still be weak, but less weak than above. 
Other efficiency considerations:  We predict that the other assorted efficiency arguments 
– including the socially wasteful expenditure of resources, the potential public good nature of 
risk classification, efficient redistribution, and positive externalities of risky behavior – will tend 
not to impact legislative and regulatory choices.  All of these efficiency arguments would tend to 
support risk classification regulation (in contrast to those noted above) on the basis of broad 
social efficiency benefits.105  But interest groups will tend not to coalesce around these social 
efficiency arguments because their benefits accrue not to small and easily identifiable groups, but 
                                                          
99 See Part I, supra. 
100 See part I, supra.   Whether policyholders fully understand the link between their mortality risk and their 
gender may be variable.  See Howell Jackson & Allison Hoffman, Retiree Out-of-Pocket Healtcare Spending: A Study 
of Consumer Expectations and Policy Implications, 39 AM. J. LAW & MED. 1 (2013). 
101 See part I, supra. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 See Part I, supra. 
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to the diffuse public.106  Similarly, while we expect that state lawmakers will be publicly-
oriented in some cases, we expect that none of the efficiency arguments in support of risk-
classification regulation are sufficiently large or publicly salient to generate substantial 
momentum on this basis alone. This especially true these restrictions may limit insurers’ 
potential profit, and thus face industry opposition. 
2.  Fairness based predictions 
Control and social solidarity:  As mentioned above, we predict that the greater the 
control an insured has over a characteristic, the weaker will be the average insurance anti-
discrimination law, both for efficiency (moral hazard) and fairness reasons.  The other reason 
why we expect this to be true is that, insofar as insurance anti-discrimination laws are about 
achieving some degree of social solidarity (or redistribution from better off to less well off), such 
arguments tend to be most persuasive, or easily accepted, in situations in which individuals lack 
control over their circumstances.107 
Socially suspect characteristics: Here we have two general predictions, the strong version 
and the weak version.  The strong version is that, when there is general agreement that a 
characteristic is socially suspect (based for example  on constitutional jurisprudence), every 
jurisdiction will have a law forbidding insurers from using that characteristic across all lines, 
even if the characteristic may not have any predictive value in a particular line.  As a proxy for 
the strong-version prediction we use the Supreme Court’s concept of suspect classifications, 
which includes race, religion, and national origin, and quasi-suspect classifications, which 
includes gender.108 The weaker prediction is that, for such characteristics, at least the average 
level of anti-discrimination regulation will be stronger than the average level of regulation of 
other characteristics.  Also, if there are characteristics that are well-known, or even widely 
suspected, proxies for socially suspect characteristics, such as zip code as a proxy for race, we 
expect similar results, although probably not as strong:  that is, there will be fewer states with 
                                                          
106 See Part II.A, supra. 
107 The social solidarity/redistribution idea also suggests a cross-state prediction, one that we do not yet have 
the data fully to test:  Given that insurance anti-discrimination laws can be viewed as a form of redistribution from 
the better off (the ones without the high-risk characteristic) to the less well off (the ones with the high-risk 
characteristic), we predict that states in which voters are relatively hostile to government redistribution via the tax 
and transfer system will have relatively weak insurance anti-discrimination laws. We expect this effect to be 
strongest where the redistributive argument is strongest:  for example, where there is relatively little control on the 
part of the insured.  A simple albeit rough way of differentiating between redistribution-friendly and redistribution-
hostile states would be to look at the blue state/red state divide in recent Presidential elections, where the issue of the 
appropriate degree of redistribution (through income tax progressivity and health care finance) has been a key 
component of the campaigns.  Relatedly, states in which voters are relatively open to anti-discrimination law in 
other contexts (as shown in survey research or in the existence of state anti-discrimination laws of other types) will 
be relatively more likely to have strong insurance anti-discrimination laws.  Perhaps the blue state/red state divide 
would work here as well. 
108 See supra discussion at note __.  Obviously, the equal protection clause has no binding effect on private 
insurance companies, but rather serves only as a limitation on state power.  We use the concept only as a rough 
proxy for characteristics that are universally regarded as inappropriate bases for risk segregation. 
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outright bans, and the average strictness of the regulation will be less, than for the socially 
suspect classification itself. 
Correlation and Causation:  The correlation/causation concern from Part I suggests that 
stronger anti-discrimination laws will exist for characteristics that do not have a clear causal 
connection to risk.  At the same time, insurers will presumably lobby extensively to use 
characteristics that provide useful risk-related information, irrespective of their causal link to 
loss.  Our prediction then is that, there should be stronger restrictions on average for traits that 
are perceived not to have a causal relationship with the risk they are said to reflect. 
Privacy:  We predict that characteristics that are considered private and/or that require 
effort by the policyholder to acquire will be more highly regulated. 
3.  Applying the predictions to the nine characteristics 
How will these general predictions play out for the various line/characteristic 
combinations that we examine below?  
Race, national origin, and religion (the “big three”):  Race, national origin, and religion 
have a special place in this country’s history; and, as discussed above, discrimination on the 
basis of these three characteristics has been subject to stricter scrutiny in American law than have 
other characteristics. Therefore, relying on the general predictions above with respect to socially 
suspect classifications, we predict that race, national origin, and religion will be prohibited 
characteristics in every state across every line. A weaker form of the prediction is that these 
three characteristics will be more strictly regulated on average than will the other 
characteristics.  We make these predictions for all three of these characteristics, even though not 
all of them correlate in an obvious way with the risks associated with all five lines of insurance.        
Gender:  Gender-based discrimination in insurance has long been controversial.109 And 
differential treatment on the basis of gender is, of course, in many contexts widely considered 
unacceptable or illegal.110 Nevertheless, there does not seem to be the same level of agreement—
as there is for the race, religion, and national origin—that drawing gender-based distinctions is 
always wrong. As discussed above, federal constitutional law treats gender as only a quasi-
suspect classification; as a result, laws that discriminate on the basis of gender are subject to an 
intermediate level of scrutiny.  This means a more searching scrutiny for laws that discriminate 
                                                          
109 Indeed, the question of the legality under the federal employment discrimination laws of gendered 
differences in insurance (or pension) premiums and payouts sparked one of the more important and interesting 
debates regarding what constitutes unfair or illicit discrimination in the insurance context and what constitutes 
merely a fair allocation of costs.   Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Efficient Use of 
Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 250 (1983); see also 
Spencer L. Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 4 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 83, 108 (1979) 
(“Age discrimination is so basic in life insurance and annuities that any serious challenge to it seems unlikely.”).. 
110 John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1337, 1365-66 (1989). 
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on the basis of gender than for laws that discriminate on the basis of other characteristics, but 
less searching scrutiny than for race, national origin, or religion. Therefore, we predict that there 
will be more variability across the states with respect to laws regulating insurance gender 
discrimination than with respect to laws restricting the use of the big three, perhaps with states 
clustering around either end of the spectrum.  In addition, because gender equity arguments tend 
to be used to improve the lot of women relative to men, and gender equity is a salient public 
issue that attracts various public interest groups, we also predict that the gender discrimination 
will be more strictly regulated on average for health insurance (where gender-rated policies 
often result in higher premiums for women) than for auto insurance (where gender-rated policies 
result in higher premiums for men).  However, with respect to life insurance, we predict that the 
laws regulating gender discrimination will be on average relatively weak, since adverse 
selection in the life insurance market is especially problematic. Regarding property/casualty 
insurance, as there seems to be no conceivable correlation between those risks, we predict either 
states will cluster around no regulation, or, alternatively, states will cluster around forbidding 
the use of gender in p/c insurance on symbolic or expressive grounds.  It is also possible that 
there will be a bi-modal distribution along those lines. 
Sexual orientation: Unlike with race, national origin, religion, and gender, legal 
classifications on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation has not been identified by the 
Supreme Court as deserving special scrutiny.  In addition, unlike race, national origin, and 
gender, there are no federal laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in 
employment.111 However, there are state laws that forbid discrimination on the basis sexual 
orientation,112 and some lower courts have held that sexual orientation should be a suspect or 
quasi-suspect characteristic.113  It is safe to say that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation is at least highly controversial.  Moreover, discrimination in insurance on the basis of 
sexual orientation would also implicate substantial privacy concerns. Thus, we predict that on 
average, with respect to life and health insurance, sexual orientation will be a moderately 
regulated characteristic, less regulated than big three and somewhat less regulated than gender, 
but more heavily regulated than age. Moreover, there may be some cross-state variation. 
Because there is little reason to believe that sexual orientation correlates with property or liability 
risks, we expect relatively little if any regulation of sexual orientation in the auto and 
property/casualty lines. 
Age: We expect that age will have the lowest average regulatory score of all the risk 
characteristics we are studying. First, age is not a suspect classification, at least not by 
constitutional standards.  Second, age tends to correlate causally with several important areas of 
risk (mortality, health, and perhaps disability risks), thereby increasing the perceived fairness of 
                                                          
111  
112 See, e.g., Sexual Orientation Non-Discrimination Act (NY 2002). 
113 Windsor v. United States, 12-2335-CV, 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (finding that sexual 
orientation is a quasi-suspect classification and, on that basis, striking down DOMA as applied to the federal estate 
tax). 
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rating on that basis.114 Third, age can present serious adverse selection problems for insurers, 
since individual insureds know their own age and the risks associated with their age.115  Fourth, 
social solidarity arguments with respect to age are relatively weak, since individuals can spread 
risk over their lifetime through various income smoothing products. These factors are likely most 
important with respect to life insurance, where the casual connection between age and risk is 
obvious and regulatory restrictions would create large adverse selection concerns.   Therefore, 
for life insurance, we predict that almost every state will either have no regulation or will 
explicitly permit the use of age.   Regulatory restrictions on age could also create adverse 
selection problems with disability and health insurance, though these may be less severe because 
these lines of coverage are often sold on a group basis.  As such, we expect more variation 
among the states for the use of age in health and disability, perhaps fewer with rules specifically 
permitting age-based classifications than with life insurance. With respect to auto insurance, age 
is a relatively strong proxy for driving risks, meaning that insurers have an interest in lobbying 
against age-limitations. At the same time, the causal link between age and auto risk is contestable 
potentially complicating the fairness argument.  Even if age is causally connected with auto 
risks, it is arguably unfair to group all similarly-aged drivers together.116  These concerns lead us 
to expect variation across states with respect to whether, and how, insurers can use age in auto 
insurance underwriting.  Because we are unaware of any correlation between age and non-auto 
property/casualty risks, we expect that most states will not regulate of the use of age with respect 
to property/casualty insurance.   
Credit score and zip code:  Credit score and zip code are not, by themselves, socially 
suspect characteristics.  However, as mentioned in Part I, some commentators have argued that 
credit score and zip code are used by auto and home insurers as proxies for socially suspect 
characteristics, such as race. By contrast, insurers argue that credit scores and zip codes are 
predictive of loss experience for reasons having nothing to do with these factors. Given the 
history of this debate, we predict that there will be a substantial number of states that limit, 
though few outright prohibitions of, the use of credit score and zip code in auto insurance and 
for homeowners’ insurance.  However, because insurers seem to have done a better job of public 
relations and of lobbying, we expect to see a fair amount of variation among states, perhaps with 
a bi-modal distribution of some states clustering around no regulation and others clustering 
around limits. We expect little regulation with respect to credit score and zip code for disability, 
health, and life insurance,, since we are unaware of any correlation between risk in these lines 
and credit score or zip code.117  More generally, we expect the average regulatory score to be 
higher for zip code and credit score than for age, but lower than for race, national origin, and 
religion. 
                                                          
114 See Part I.C, supra. 
115 See Part I.B, supra. 
116 This is the differential inaccuracy point discussed in Part I. See Part I.C, supra. 
117 While it is true that some have argued that zip code and perhaps credit score are proxies for other factors that 
may correspond to health, disability, or life risks, we insurers do not appear to be interested in using zip code and 
credit score in those lines. 
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Genetics:  Laws limiting the ability of insurers, especially health and life insurers, to use 
genetic tests in underwriting insurance can be defended on redistributive and privacy grounds, 
for reasons discussed above.  They can also be defended on efficiency grounds, as insurer usage 
of this characteristic could deter individual knowledge acquisition.  Therefore, we would expect 
that anti-discrimination laws will on average tend to be more restrictive for genetic testing than 
for characteristics that do not present such an argument (such as age).  We would expect no 
regulation of genetics for auto or p/c insurance, as there is no apparent connection to those 
risks.  With respect to life insurance, we would predict that genetic testing would be permitted or 
not regulated in almost all states, for adverse selection reasons. Given the federal law forbidding 
genetics in health insurance, we predict that for health most states would prohibit.  Because 
disability insurance presents greater moral hazard concerns, we expect more variation—more 
willingness to allow. 
All of our predictions are summarized in the following table. The columns represent the 
five lines of insurance, and the rows are for the nine characteristics we examined.  
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State Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws:  Predictions 
 Auto Disability Health Life Property/ 
Casualty 
Race Prohibited  across all 
states (highest 
average level of 
strictness) 
Prohibited  
across all states 
(highest average 
level of 
strictness) 
Prohibited  across all states 
(highest average level of 
strictness) 
Prohibited  across all 
states (highest 
average level of 
strictness) 
Prohibited  across all 
states (highest 
average level of 
strictness) 
National 
origin 
Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race 
Religion Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race Same as race 
Gender Variation across 
states; with some 
states permitting 
and others  
prohibiting or 
limiting, possible bi-
modal distribution 
(bmd) 
Variation across 
states; some 
states 
permitting and 
others  
prohibiting or 
limiting  
Variation across states; 
some states permitting and 
others prohibit or limit; 
fewer and weaker 
limitations than with auto 
insurance on average, 
because of AS concerns and 
because discrimination here 
tends to help women 
No regulation or 
explicitly permitted 
in substantially all 
states, mainly 
because of adverse 
selection and 
discrimination here 
helps women 
 
No regulation in 
substantially all 
states, because not 
relevant to risk, or 
prohibited on 
expressive grounds, 
possiblebmd 
 
Sexual 
Orient. 
No regulation, 
because not relevant 
to risk 
 
Variation across 
states (some 
states 
prohibiting; 
others not 
regulating; 
possible bmd) 
 
Variation across states 
(some states prohibiting; 
others not regulating; 
possible bmd) 
 
Variation across 
states (some states 
prohibiting; others 
not regulating; 
possible bmd) 
 
No regulation, 
because not relevant 
to risk 
 
Age limited regulation, 
with some variation 
across states  
limited 
regulation  
limited regulation  no regulation or 
explicitly permit 
No regulation 
Credit 
Score 
Variation across 
states; with some 
not regulating and 
others limiting on 
proxy grounds 
No regulation No regulation No regulation Variation across 
states; with some 
not regulating and 
others limiting on 
proxy grounds 
Zip Code Same as credit score 
 
Same as credit 
score 
 
Same as credit score 
 
Same as credit score 
 
Same as credit score 
 
Genetics No regulation  Relatively weak 
regulation on 
average, but 
with variation 
across states 
 
Most states prohibiting, as 
in federal law; or no states 
prohibiting, because of 
federal law 
 
No regulation or 
specifically 
permitted, because 
of adverse selection 
No regulation  
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Part III.  The Data 
A.  Empirical Methodology and Coding of State Laws 
Although there has been considerable theorizing about the extent to which insurance 
companies should be allowed to discriminate among insureds in the underwriting process, there 
has been almost no research on the question what the law actually permits. It is a surprisingly 
complex and difficult issue.  Because the governing law in this area is primarily state law, we 
first had to identify and analyze the relevant state statutes and regulations in all 50 states as well 
as the District of Columbia, as of 2012.  To make the project manageable, we focused 
specifically on how states have regulated insurers’ use of the nine characteristics – race, religion, 
national origin, gender, age, genetic testing, credit score, sexual orientation, and geographic 
location – and we focused on the five largest lines of insurance – life, health, disability, auto, and 
property/casualty.118  This exercise revealed statutes at all levels of generality:  statutes that 
limited or prohibited all “unfair discrimination” in all lines of insurance with no mention of 
particular traits;119 statutes that limited or prohibited “unfair discrimination” generally within a 
particular line of insurance;120 and statutes that limited or prohibited the use of one or more 
specific characteristics either for all lines121 or for a specific line of insurance.122 
                                                          
118 With one large exception, the category of “property/casualty” insurance includes first-party property 
insurance and all liability insurance, including homeowners’ insurance coverage.  The exception is auto insurance, 
which includes both first party and liability components and is so large in terms of premium volume and the like that 
it was given its own category. 
119 For example, Texas law provides that an insurer may not use a rate that is “unfairly discriminatory.”  Tex. 
Ins. Code § 560.002(a)(2)(c).  Oklahoma, by contrast, treats “unfair discrimination” as a type of prohibited “unfair 
or deceptive act or practice.”  36 Okl. St. § 1204(7).  In total, 28 states have general statutes forbidding “unfair 
discrimination” or “unfairly discriminatory” rates by insurers or both across all (or multiple) lines of insurance.  
Those states are:  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.   
120 For example, North Carolina prohibits “unfair discrimination” in life insurance rates.  N.C.G.S § 58-58-35; § 
58-63-15(7)(a).  Likewise, South Dakota. SDCL § 58-33-12.  In fact, every state except Iowa, Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin has a statute prohibiting “unfair discrimination” by insurers or “unfairly discriminatory” 
rates or both in connection with life insurance in particular.  Another example of general anti-discrimination statutes 
that apply to specific lines would be property/casualty insurance.  There are 27 states, and the District of Columbia, 
that such statutes.  See, e.g., O.R.C. §3901.21(M) (Ohio); Gen.Laws 1956, § 27-44-5(Rhode Island); and MCL § 
500.2403 (Michigan). 
121 For example, Delaware has a general statute forbidding the use of race in connection with any type of 
insurance.  18 Del Code 2304(22) (“It shall be an unlawful practice for any insurance company licensed to do 
business in this State to discriminate in any way because of the insured's race, color, religion, sexual orientation or 
national origin”).  Arkansas, by contrast, has a general statute that limits but does not outright prohibit the use of 
race in any area of insurance.  Specifically, it forbids “refusing to insure or continue to insure an individual or risks 
solely because of the individual’s race, color, creed, national origin, citizenship, status as a victim of domestic abuse, 
or sex.” A.C.A. § 23-66-206(14)(G)(i).  This very common type of limitation statute, found in many states, seems to 
suggest that race, and other suspect categories, may be used, but only if they can be backed up by accurate and 
reliable actuarial data.   
122 For example, Utah has a statute forbidding the use of race in insurance ratemaking for property/casualty 
insurance in particular.   Utah Code Ann. § 31A-19a-202(3)(c).  Ohio has an anti-discrimination provision that is 
particular both to race and to property/casualty insurance; however, that statute forbids the use of taking race into 
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Based on these state statutes, we assigned a code for each line/trait combination for each 
state.  We ended up with six possible codes that we arranged along a continuum, from those that 
are least restrictive of insurers’ underwriting decisions to those that are most restrictive.  At one 
end of the continuum are statutes that expressly permit the use of a particular trait, and at the 
other end are outright prohibitions of particular traits.  Between these two extremes, the “general 
restriction” statutes (that is, the general unfair discrimination statutes) were treated as being more 
restrictive than the absence of any relevant statute, but as being less restrictive than statutes that 
specifically mention the trait in question. The entire continuum is reproduced below:123    
Expressly Permit (-1) — The state has a statute expressly or impliedly permitting insurers to 
take the characteristic into account.  
No Law on Point (0) — The state laws are silent with respect to the particular characteristic. 
General Restriction (1) — The state has a statute that generally prohibits “unfair 
discrimination,” either across all lines of insurance or in some lines of insurance, but that statute 
does not provide any explanation as to what constitutes unfair discrimination and does not single 
out any particular trait for limitation.   
Characteristic-Specific Weak Limitation (2) — The state has a statute that limits the use of a 
particular characteristic in either issuance, renewal, or cancellation. 
Characteristic-Specific Strong Limitation (3)  —  The state has a statute that prohibits the use 
of a particular characteristic when the policy is either issued, renewed, or cancelled, or the state 
has a statute that limits but does not completely prohibit the use of a particular characteristic in 
rate-setting. 
Characteristic-Specific Prohibition (4) — The state has a statute the expressly prohibits 
insurers from taking into account a specific characteristic in setting rates. 
After arriving at an initial code based upon the state statutes for every line of insurance, 
for every characteristic, in every state, we went back and examined judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings within each jurisdiction to determine if the initial code was changed by a 
decision. Surprisingly, out of the 2295 trait/line combinations (9 traits times 5 lines of insurance 
times 51 jurisdictions), only 16 total trait/line combinations were changed.  In sum, judicial and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
account in decisions regarding whether to issue or renew a policy.  O.R.C. §4112.02(H)(4).  In total, 33 states and 
the District of Columbia either limit or forbid the use of race by property/casualty insurers.  Interestingly, only six 
states – Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia – impose any limit on the use of 
gender in life insurance.    
123 We acknowledge that this continuum from permissive to stringent restrictions is neither perfectly continuous 
nor perfectly scaled, but it is the best that can be done given the nature of the data.  It allows us to “see” the data in a 
way that makes it more accessible.  As with any grading scale, the differences between immediately contiguous 
scores (e.g., the difference between B+ and an A-) can be slim in some cases.  But the hope is that averages, across 
lots of measurements, will have some meaning; and the differences in the extremes (e.g., the A and the C) will likely 
reveal important differences. 
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administrative interpretation of the state statutes had very little effect on the final coding 
results.124 
Our approach to coding the various laws has an important limitation.  First, our coding 
continuum, is, for simplicity, equidistant, even though the actual laws are not. That is, we assume 
that the distant between zero to one is similar to the distant between one and two,  Second, and 
more importantly, many of the various intermediate limitations—which are, after all, laws 
requiring a showing of statistical correlation between the characteristic and the risks in 
question— may, in practice, be relatively simple for insurers to satisfy.  In those cases, there will 
be little difference between strong limitations, weak limitations, general limitations, no mentions, 
and express permits.  Instead, the important distinction will be between the states that have 
outright prohibitions with respect to a particular line/characteristic combination and those states 
that do not.  
 
B. The results 
In this section we discuss the extent to which the data are consistent with the hypotheses 
developed in part II.  To do so, we report some basic summary statistics.  In some cases we 
report average strictness scores. That is, we simply take the average of the codes for a given set 
of states for a particular characteristic or line/characteristic combination. We also examine the 
individual state scores that make up these averages, the variance in state laws and the extent to 
which distributions tend to be bi-modal.  We ran various statistical tests on the data, but 
eyeballing the graphs proved to be just as revealing.  Those graphs, for each line/characteristic 
combination, are included in the appendix.   
 
 1.  Race, Religion, National origin (The “big three”) 
 
Figures 1 to 3 present our finding regarding the “big three” for auto insurance, yet much 
of the analysis remains the same for other lines of insurance.   
                                                          
124 Among the few but interesting exceptions to this conclusion is Guidry v. Pellerin Life, in which a federal 
court applying Louisiana’s general unfair discrimination statute holds that discrimination on the basis of race is life 
insurance is not unfair, discussed below. 
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 Figure 1- Distribution of States’ Scores for Race, in Auto Insurance 
  
Figure 2 - Distribution of States’ Scores for National Origin, in Auto Insurance 
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Figure 3- Distribution of States’ Scores for Religion, in Auto Insurance 
 
 Perhaps the most surprising finding was the fact that states do not uniformly prohibit 
insurers from using race, religion, and national origin—contradicting our strong prediction about 
the big three characteristics.  Figure 4 below reveals that only seven states have forbidden the use 
of race, national origin, and religion across all lines of insurance.  Those states are California, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.  Two additional 
states—Georgia and North Carolina—prohibit the use by insurers of race and national origin, but 
do not apply the same prohibition to religion. In contrast, only one state, Louisiana, explicitly 
permits the use of race in life insurance.  
Characteristic Number of Jurisdictions Completely 
Prohibiting Use of Characteristic in All 
Five Lines of Insurance 
Race 9  (CA,GA,NJ,NM,NY,NC,TX,WA,WI) 
National Origin 9 (CA,GA,NJ,NM,NY,NC,TX,WA,WI) 
Religion 7 (CA,NJ,NM,NY,TX,WA,WI) 
Gender 1 
 
 
(MT) 
Age 0  
Credit Score 0  
Genetic Testing 0  
Sexual Orientation 5 (CA, DE,FL, KY, UT,VT, WA) 
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Zip Code 0  
 
Figure 4 
 
The next finding observable in Figures 1 to 3 above is that regardless of the level of 
restrictiveness the treatment of the “big three” is highly correlated (with an average Spearman’s 
rho of 0.9) in all states.  In fact, as these 3 graphs show, the scores per line of insurance are 
almost identical for these three characteristics with property/casualty insurance being the most 
restrictive line of insurance, then auto, health, life and lastly disability insurance.  
 
Our weaker prediction of course was confirmed:  As Figure 5 shows, more states forbid 
insurers from using race, national origin, and religion across all lines of coverage than for any of 
the other characteristics. In addition, the average level of regulation of the big three is 
significantly stricter (at less than 1% level), applying our strictness coding system described 
above, than for the other six characteristics we studied, as shown in Figure 5. Interestingly, the 
prohibition on using religious affiliation is stricter on average than the prohibition on using race 
or national origin.  
Figure 5 also shows that at the most general level the regulation of the various 
characteristics follows the federal constitutional law principles where race, national origin and 
religion are suspect classifications, gender is quasi-suspect and sexual orientation is not far 
behind.  
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Figure 5 
 
While these results confirm our hypothesis that the “big three” will be treated the same, 
there remains an  interesting question: why is the use of race, national origin, and religion not 
prohibited in every state in the country?  We have a number of theories.   
First, perhaps state regulators and their constituents are under the impression that federal 
law already bans the use of these characteristics. At least two federal statutes could conceivably 
be interpreted to forbid discrimination on these bases by insurers. First, the Fair Housing Act 
[“FHA”] makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to 
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to 
any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”125  Although 
federal courts were split about the FHA’s applicability to homeowners’ insurance,126 new 
regulations now make clear that the statute does indeed apply in this domain, thus prohibiting 
racial discrimination in homeowners’ insurance.127  Even so, however, the statute does not affect 
any other type of insurance.   
The other federal antidiscrimination law that could conceivably be applied to limit insurer 
discrimination is 42 USC 1981, which forbids racial discrimination in the making of contracts.  
But no court has interpreted Section 1981 in this manner, and at least one federal district court 
has held that Section 1981 did not apply to a claim that life insurers in Louisiana charged higher 
premiums to African American insureds than to other insureds.128 The court noted that Section 
1981 requires proof of intentional discrimination on the basis of race, and the evidence in the 
case supported the defendant insurer’s claim that any race-based premium differential reflected 
differences in risks.  That is the only case we found addressing the application of Section 1981 to 
insurance transactions; and it went in favor of the insurer.129 Thus, if states have failed to enact 
                                                          
125 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (emphasis added).   
126 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351 (6th Cir. 1995)(holding that the McCarran-
Ferguson Act does not reverse-preempt the application of the FHA to homeowners’ insurance), NAACP v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 E2d 287 (7th Cir. 1992) (same), Nat'l Fair Hous. Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2002), Toledo Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 94 Ohio Misc. 2d 151 
(Ohio C.P. 1997), and Dunn v. Midwestern Indem. Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 472 E Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979). 
127 See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight. 
128 Guidry v. Pellerin Life Ins. Co., 364 F.Supp.2d 592 (2005). 
129 This case is the reason we code Louisiana as being the only state that expressly permits race to be used for a 
particular line of insurance, here life insurance.    This coding, however, should be taken with a grain of salt.  A 
close reading of the Guidry case leaves unclear whether the insurer in the case was using explicitly insurance 
premiums that had been calculated explicitly on the basis of race.  It is clear from the opinion that the insurer was 
systematically and knowingly charging African Americans a higher rate than whites, owing to a higher average risk 
of mortality for African Americans.  Indeed, the opinion says that, “up until April1, 1982, Louisiana law mandated 
the use of separate published rates for whites and African-Americans.” But it is not clear from the opinion whether 
this dual-pricing resulted from insurers’ asking about race on their insurance applications or rather from insurers’ 
using proxies for race.  Of course, even if proxies for race are used, if they are knowingly used in order to sort 
people according to race, which is clearly the implication of the opinion, then it would be the same as if race were 
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prohibitions because they assumed that federal law already did the job, that assumption may be 
mistaken.130 In any event, this explanation would not explain the results for national origin and 
religion.  
Second, state legislatures may not have banned insurer usage of the big three because 
they believe that insurers have stopped using race, national origin, and religion already and thus 
that a law prohibiting their use would simply be unnecessary. In other words, perhaps the anti-
discrimination regulatory work is already being done by informal social norms. On this view, 
insurers understand that if they were to attempt to risk classify on the basis of race, for example, 
that fact might be discovered, producing serious reputational repercussions.131 There is probably 
some explanatory power to this story.  We in fact rarely if ever hear of insurers using race, 
national origin or religion when underwriting individual insurance policies these days.132 
However, even if explicit discrimination on the basis of the big three is a rarity in insurance, it 
does not follow that implicit forms of discrimination do not occur.  Moreover, if social norms are 
already discouraging the use of these characteristics, why do so many states have laws 
forbidding their use? If the answer has to do with the expressive or symbolic effect of the laws, 
then it remains a puzzle why  only some states care enough about this sort of expressive or 
symbolic benefit to enact the prohibitions?133   
Third, and related to the norms explanation, maybe the lack of a universal ban has 
something to do with timing.  It could be that a number of states enacted prohibitions on the use 
of the big three characteristics and then those laws contributed to creating a norm against their 
use, at which point the other states did not need to adopt the same laws.  The data for this paper 
do not allow us to examine timing issues, as we are looking only at the law as currently enacted.  
But we are in the process of doing research on how the laws have changed over time, in all 51 
jurisdictions, which may permit us to look at this possibility. 
2. Gender 
Figure 6 presents the main finding for gender.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
directly asked about on the application.  The key fact seems to be an absence of evidence of racial animus on the 
part of the insurer, and there reason the court found no evidence was that the dual-pricing in fact correlated with 
actuarial risk. 
130 J. Gabriel McGlamery, Raced Based Underwriting and the Death of Burial Insurance, 15 Conn. Ins. L. J. 
531 (2009) (suggesting a similar story to explain why life insurers stopped using race decades ago, despite the fact 
that it was technically legal to do so). 
131 Id.. 
132 There are insurers who ask about religious affiliation.  [example: divorce insurance] 
133 In a subsequent study that looks more a cross-state variation, taking into account differences in state voters 
preferences for such things as fairness, we may be able to find some answers to these questions. 
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Figure 6 - Distribution of States’ Scores for Gender, by Line of Insurance 
 
Figure 6 shows thatmany states permit the usage of gender, especially in life and health 
insurance.  As figure six suggests, the average level of regulation for gender risk classification is, 
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as we predicted, less strict than for race, religion, and national origin but more strict than age.   
This difference is statistically significant.134    Figure six is also consistent with our prediction 
that there would be a large degree of variation across states.  Finally, Figure six is somewhat 
consistent with our prediction that for gender discrimination in auto, disability, and health 
insurance, state would vary in the intensity of their regulation, with some states clustering around 
strong limitations and others around no limitations or specific permissions.   
The results are more mixed for another of our predictions: that the average score for 
gender in auto and life insurance would be lower (less strict) than in health insurance because 
discrimination by insurers in auto and life insurance tends to help women whereas discrimination 
in health insurance tends to hurt them.  Life insurance is indeed less regulated than health 
insurance, but auto insurance is more regulated on average, as shown in Figure 3. 
 Figure Seven shows that the results are also mixed for our prediction that states would 
tend to permit insurer discrimination for gender, with large number of “specifically permits.”135  
                                                          
134 A Wilcoxon sign-rank test as well as a simple student t-test show a difference which is significant at less 
than 1% between the “big three” and gender as well as between gender and sexual orientation, the closest 
characteristic from below.However, for disability insurance there is no significant difference between the way the 
“big three” and gender are treated. For life and health insurance, there is no significant difference between the way 
gender and sexual orientation are treated. 
135 Recall that this prediction was based on the adverse selection problems associated with individually 
underwritten life insurance and because such discrimination actually benefits women. 
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Figure 7 
As Figure Seven shows, the average score for life insurance/gender is in fact lower than for the 
other line/gender combinations.   This difference is statistically significant in all cases, except 
with respect to the difference between life and health.136 Although there are a large number of 
states that specifically permit the use of gender with life insurance, there are also a large number 
that impose a strong limitation, which again generally means a requirement that the insurer be 
able to show that gender correlates with loss claims.  More consistent with our prediction is the 
fact that only two states (Montana and North Carolina) forbid the use of gender in life insurance 
underwriting.  
Figure seven is even more inconsistent with our prediction of a low average score and 
lots of “no mentions,” with respect to the use of gender in property/casualty insurance (excluding 
auto insurance).137”   As Figure 7 shows, gender (just like the “big three” above) is more heavily 
regulated in the property/casualty line than in any other line of insurance.  Why is this?  One 
answer is that property/casualty insurers are, in fact, using gender more than we assumed.  That 
                                                          
136 We use a Wilcoxon rank-sum test for unmatched data.  
137 Recall that this was due to the fact that we believed there was no obvious correlation between gender and 
non-auto liability and property risks.  See Part II, supra. Figure four shows that our alternative prediction, that 
there may be a bi-modal distribution between states that have no statute on point and those that have outright 
prohibitions on other grounds was also not especially borne out, although there was a fair amount of variability. 
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explains why there are almost no “no-mention” in property/casualty for gender. But why 
restricting the use of gender and not permit it?  Recall our discussion above that adverse 
selection is less of a problem with property/casualty insurance than with some other lines of 
insurance, such as life and health insurance.  Alternatively, there is always the possibility that 
insurers work together to pass these bans in order to limit the competition among them.  
 
Another possibility is that state legislatures pass laws such as this not because they 
believe they are needed to curb certain behavior on the part of insurers, but because the laws 
create the (in these cases, false) impression that they are doing something productive.  One can 
see how such legislation could easily get passed. The insurers would not object, since the laws 
restrict them from doing something that they do not want to do anyway. Indeed, insurers may 
support such laws, whose passage may reduce the demand from voters for action on other fronts. 
The insuring public also would not  object, because, as far as they know, these pointless laws are 
in fact constraining insurers from some socially harmful activity.  Who pushes for such 
legislation?  Again, the legislators themselves, who need to give the impression they are doing 
something, without offending an important constituency.138   
3. Sexual Orientation  
For life/health insurance, we predicted a moderate level of average regulation for insurer 
usage of sexual orientation: less strict than for the big three but stricter than for age.  This 
prediction is borne out in Figure 5.  The difference is statistically significant.139  Our prediction 
that state laws on this topic would be variable also found some limited support in the data.  Five 
states have outright bans on the use of sexual orientation across all lines of insurance.140  Sexual 
orientation is the only characteristic other than the “Big three” and gender about which that can 
be said in any state.  This fits the federal constitutional law with respect to the role of sexual 
orientation as a suspect classification compared with the big three and gender.  
Nevertheless, the dominant response among states with respect to sexual orientation is to 
have no specific regulation on sexual orientation at all, and this is true across all lines.  With 
respect to health insurance, for example, eighteen states either prohibit or strongly limit the use 
of sexual orientation and all the other states have no specific regulation on sexual orientation, but 
                                                          
138 Amy Monahan has done research that explores this hypothesis.   In particular, she has an article showing that 
the health insurance mandates that states are most likely to pass are those that are already included in virtually every 
health insurance policy in the state.   She explains this result as an example of the legislatures-trying-to-look-
productive theory.  Amy Monahan, Fairness versus Welfare in Health Insurance Content Regulation (working 
paper) (January 6, 2012), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1980764. 
139 A Wilcoxon rank sum test shows the differences are significant at less than 1% 
140 See Figure 4.  Those states are California, Delaware, Utah, Vermont and Washington. Colorado would have 
been the sixth, but for their failure to apply their prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to 
auto insurance.   
41
Avraham et al.:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
42 
 
have only general unfair discrimination laws.141 The treatment is similar with the other lines of 
insurance.   
What does all of this mean?  There are a number of possibilities.  First, perhaps the large 
majority of states believe that their general unfair discrimination statues will be applied to sexual 
orientation as well.  Second, maybe state lawmakers believe that insurers will not use sexual 
orientation in any event, for any of several reasons:  (a) because insurers are constrained by 
social norms, as they seem to be with race, religion, and national origin; (b) because insurers do 
not see any strong correlation after all between insured risks and sexual orientation, and thus opt 
not to invite the controversy. Indeed, when most general restrictions laws were enacted, sexual 
orientation was probably not on states’ legislatures’ minds. It is an artifact of our coding that 
sexual orientation gets so many category ones. It can be reasonably interpreted as category zero- 
no law on point; (c) because insurers are skeptical of their ability to ascertain sexual orientation 
reliably; or (d) because insurers have discovered other, more direct ways of getting at the sources 
of risk in question (such as HIV tests).     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
141 The remaining line/characteristic specific charts are contained in the appendix. 
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Figure 8 - Distribution of States’ Scores for Sexual Orientation, by Line of Insurance 
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4. Age 
Our general prediction that age would be the least regulated on average proved accurate, 
as reflected in Figure 5.The difference between age and credit score (the closet category) is 
significant in general at the 1% level, (although the difference is not significant for auto and 
property/casualty lines of insurance).  Our specific prediction with respect to life insurance 
proved reasonably accurate as well:  39 states specifically permit the use of age in life insurance; 
and the remaining states merely impose a general unfair discrimination limitation.  Health 
insurance is similar, but with less uniformity:  36 states permit the use of age in health insurance; 
and the rest impose specific regulations.142  Our predictions regarding the regulation of the use of 
age in the auto insurance markets (variability across states) was in the ballpark, though the 
amount of variation is somewhat more than we expected, as reflected in Figure 9, below.  
 
     
                                                          
142 Twelve states impose either a strong or weak limitation, and one state, NY, prohibits the use of age in health 
insurance. 
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Figure 9 - Distribution of States’ Scores for Age Orientation, by Line of Insurance 
We predicted relatively few specific statutes would regulate property/casualty insurance 
with respect to age, only because of the seeming irrelevance of age.  In fact, there were more 
than a few (twenty) that had some type of specific age-related restriction property/casualty 
insurers, six of which were outright prohibitions. What this suggests, of course, is that we may 
have been wrong about the risks of property/casualty insurance—especially homeowners’ 
insurance—having no correlation with age. Indeed, when we subsequently looked into what 
kinds of questions insurers actually ask applicants for homeowners’ insurance (as revealed in 
their rate filings, in which they seek approval from regulators to take various characteristics into 
account in their underwriting), age was specifically listed. Some insurers even give senior 
discounts. So apparently age correlates more with homeowners’ risk, and thus with 
property/casualty risk, than we had thought. 
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We predicted regulation of credit score and zip would on average be more restrictive than 
for age, but less than for the big three, and that prediction was borne out. Figure 5.(As was 
mentioned before the differences in general are statistically significant at the 1% level). We 
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response), and others, a smaller number, clustering around “expressly permit.”  For zip code, 
there is less of a bi-modal split, but lots of variation.  There are very few states that prohibit the 
use of credit score or zip code in p/c and auto insurance. For health, life, and disability insurance, 
there is a great deal of variation among the states about how they treat both zip code and credit 
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prohibitions.  Somewhat surprisingly, for health insurance, substantial numbers of jurisdictions 
explicitly permit the use of zip codes; and the same can be said health, life, and disability 
insurance and credit scores.   
6.  Genetics 
Here again we predicted that the average level of regulation would be stricter than for 
age, but less than for the big three, and that is consistent with Figure 5. For life insurance in 
particular, we predicted that a substantial majority of states would either not regulate or 
specifically permit the use of genetic testing, because of adverse selection concerns.  There are 
some states that have statutes specifically permitting the use of genetic testing by life insurers 
(16), but not as many as we expected—perhaps because regulators assumed that the absence of 
limitations or prohibitions would be sufficient to allow life insurers to use genetic testing when 
necessary. There were also a few specific limitations (6), and only one prohibition on the use of 
genetic testing by life insurers.  The most common type of result was a general restriction on 
unfair discrimination, which we code as a 1 on the strictness continuum.  As with sexual 
orientation that can reflect our coding system which allows general restriction laws (category 
one) to capture characteristics that were not contemplated by states’ legislatures when they 
enacted these laws. With respect to health insurance, we predicted that, consistent with the recent 
federal law forbidding the use of genetic information, there would be similar laws at the state 
level, and that proved accurate.  All but one state prohibits the use of genetic testing in health 
insurance.  That result is even more uniform than we expected.  For disability insurance, we 
predicted more variation than with health insurance, because of the greater moral hazard concern 
than there is with health insurance.143  The result in fact shows variation, although there more 
states (20) expressly permitting the use of gender in disability insurance than we expected.  
Perhaps the moral hazard concern was larger than we imagined. 
IV. Conclusion and Reflections 
Anti-discrimination rules are a pervasive and fundamental feature of the American legal 
regime.  Thousands of academic articles and judicial opinions have thus wrestled with the rules 
that govern permissible and impermissible discrimination in domains ranging from employment 
law to constitutional law to housing law.  And yet, in the insurance domain – where 
discrimination is openly practiced and central to insurers’ business models and economic 
functions – the precise rules that govern the line between permissible and impermissible 
discrimination has been almost entirely ignored, in large part because of the complexity and 
opacity of state law on the topic.  This Article remedies this tremendous gap in the literature by 
systematically describing state insurance anti-discrimination law.    
                                                          
143 Moral hazard is a big problem for disability coverage, since a nontrivial number of people prefer, when 
possible, not to work and still get paid. 
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Our findings reveal various discrepancies between the reality of state insurance anti-
discrimination law and the largely theoretical literature on the topic.  The most surprising, and 
potentially troubling, is that such laws often have little to say about the most important and 
divisive types of discrimination: distinctions based on race, national origin, or religion.  This 
finding is normatively troubling on multiple fronts even if, as we suspect, virtually no carriers 
are explicitly taking into account these factors in their underwriting.   This is because most forms 
of discrimination in these domains operate in subtle and often unconscious ways that may 
manifest themselves, for instance, in assumptions about risk in particular neighborhoods or for 
particular products.  Even when actuarial support can be found for these assumptions, that does 
not mean that they are not intimately tied up with socially suspect characteristics.  And, even in 
the absence of any impermissible motive, important and almost entirely unexamined questions 
remain about the extent to which insurers’ use of particular characteristics that have disparate 
impacts on certain groups raise legal concerns. 
Whatever the answers are to these difficult questions, the stunted development of state 
insurance law and regulation on the topic seems to suggest a deeper problem.  In particular, it 
suggests that state law and regulation has largely ignored difficult and fundamental questions 
about how we allow insurers to discriminate – and thus spread risk across social boundaries that 
impact discrete minority groups.  Indeed, this view is substantially confirmed by the insurance 
industry’s outcry over recent federal regulations making clear that disparate impact analysis 
under the Fair Housing Act extends to the provision of the insurance that is required for 
housing.144  It is also confirmed by the variability in state laws on zip code and credit score, two 
characteristics that have been specifically alleged to operate as proxies for suspect policyholder 
characteristics. 
The states’ lack of attention to these issues, combined with the recent federal rules on the 
FHA’s applicability to insurance, suggests that it may be time for the federal government to play 
a larger role in regulating insurance discrimination impacting race, national origin, and religion. 
Indeed, federal law already pervasively regulates against discrimination on these bases, in both 
the constitution and in numerous federal statutes.145  To be sure, this fact is in tension with 
traditional primacy of states in regulating insurance markets – an approach endorsed in the 
McCarran Ferguson Act.  But that allocation of powers is not absolute, and is premised on the 
assumption that states are well-situated to regulate insurance markets effectively and, with the 
help of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, consistently.  Our results raise 
substantial questions along both domains.  
                                                          
144 See HUD Rule Imposes Disparate Impact Standard on Insurance, Insurance Compliance Insight.  
145 E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-and following (prohibiting employers from 
discriminating against applicants and employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, 
including membership in a Native American tribe); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 
621-634 (prohibiting discrimination against 40-and-over employees based on age); and the Americans With 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213 (prohibiting employers from discriminating against people with disabilities 
in any aspect of employment). 
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Nor are the normative implications of this Article’s findings limited to the “big three.”  
For instance, this Article’s findings expose a broad pattern of inconsistent and conflicting state 
laws on insurance anti-discrimination when it comes to gender.  Across numerous lines of 
coverage – including life automobile and health – state law and regulation is highly variable and 
inconsistent, despite the centrality of the prominence of these issues in public policy circles for 
decades.  Whatever our views are of the quality of state-level insurance regulation, it seems odd 
that the laws governing the circumstances in which a person may be discriminated against on the 
basis of their gender would be anything other than a national norm.  People in Delaware should 
care about, and have a policy interest in, discrimination in New Mexico, and vice versa.  In 
health insurance, at least, the Affordable Care Act preempted state law to articulate a principle 
that women should not be discriminated against even though they do indeed have higher medical 
costs, at least within certain age ranges.  Perhaps a similar approach is warranted in other lines of 
coverage. 
In addition to these normative implications, the Article also has the potential to reveal 
which theoretical arguments on risk classification in insurance have traction in state 
policymaking.  For instance, one persistent finding is that life insurance is less regulated than 
other lines of insurance.  This finding was consistent with our predictions, because life insurance 
seems more susceptible to adverse selection than other lines of insurance.  But more analysis is 
needed to determine whether this suggests, as we initially predicted, that state lawmakers and 
regulators are responsive to the risk of regulatory adverse selection due to the lobbying power 
and influence of the industry.  Similarly, consistent with our predictions, age is less regulated 
than other policyholder characteristics.  But whether this reveals more about the fairness of 
discrimination on the basis of mutable characteristics like age, or the adverse selection risk of 
regulatory risk classification restrictions on that basis, requires further interrogation and analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure - Distribution of States’ Scores for Age, by Line of Insurance 
  
Figure - Distribution of States’ Scores for Sexual Orientation, by Line of Insurance 
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Figure - Distribution of States’ Scores for Zip Code, by Line of Insurance
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Figure - Distribution of States’ Scores for Credit Score, by Line of Insurance 
  
Figure - Distribution of States’ Scores for Genetic Testing, by Line of Insurance 
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